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PROTEAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

JAMES J. BRUDNEY & LAWRENCE BAUM*
ABSTRACT
This Article is the first in-depth empirical and doctrinal analysis
of differences in statutory interpretation between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. It is also among the first to anticipate
how the Supreme Court’s interpretive approach may shift with the
passing of Justice Scalia.
We begin by identifying factors that may contribute to interpretive
divergence between the two judicial levels, based on their different
institutional structures and operational realities. In doing so, we
discuss normative implications that may follow from the prospect of
such interpretive divergence. We then examine how three circuit
courts have used dictionaries and legislative history in three subject
matter areas over the past decade and compare these findings in
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Bruhl, and participants at a Fordham Law School faculty workshop and a Yale Law School
seminar on statutory interpretation. Special thanks to Amy Torres for outstanding research
assistance.
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detail to the interpretive approach taken by the Roberts Court in the
same three fields.
We determine that the appeals courts have followed a protean
approach, adapting their usage patterns in ways that differ substantially from patterns in the Supreme Court. Court of appeals judges
use dictionaries far less relative to legislative history than do the
Justices; we found no semblance of the distinctive dictionary culture
that is prevalent on the Roberts Court. In addition, the relative
frequency of dictionary usage between the two court levels varies
considerably depending on the subject area and the type of dictionary
(general or legal). With respect to relative frequency for legislative
history, the Supreme Court, far more than the circuit courts, invokes
the record of changes in statutory text—either modified over multiple
Congresses (statutory history) or developed in successive preenactment versions of a bill (drafting history). This “vertical history”
is apparently more attractive, or less unattractive, to textualist
Justices than is traditional legislative history commentary such as
committee reports. More broadly, circuit courts regularly use
legislative history to resolve ambiguities, confirm apparent meaning,
or simply explicate legislative intent, all without characterizing its
legitimacy or systemic value.
For both dictionaries and legislative history, the eclectic approach
of the appeals courts differs markedly from the Supreme Court’s
more self-consciously articulated methodological path. We suggest
how certain sources of interpretive divergence contribute to these
differences, notably the Justices’ interaction with their colleagues in
every case and their experience as objects of continuing media and
congressional attention, some of which reflects attention that carries
over from the judicial confirmation process. We conclude that the
eclecticism of the appeals courts is likely to limit judicial discretion
more effectively than the Supreme Court’s current approach, which
favors clear interpretive rules or priorities that are applied on a
presumptively consistent basis.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past several decades, debates over statutory interpretation have focused to an extraordinary extent on the rise of textualism in the Supreme Court and the consequent disagreements
between textualists and purposivists. Legal scholars have examined
the Court’s growing appetite for dictionaries and canons,1 its diminished attention to legislative history and purpose,2 and its evolving
approach to the role of agency deference.3 Largely overlooked in the
debates is whether lower federal courts practice what the Supreme
Court has preached, or whether they ought to do so.4
We have chosen to examine two prominent interpretive resources,
one prototypically textualist—dictionaries—and the other classically
purposive—legislative history. Battles between the textualist and
purposive schools have been squarely joined at the Supreme Court
1. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND . L. REV. 1 (2005); John F.
Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999); Charles
Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
205.
3. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO . L.J. 1083 (2008).
4. Leading legislation casebooks focus almost exclusively on Supreme Court decisions.
See generally, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE , JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION : STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (5th ed. 2014); JOHN F.
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON , LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2013). There
have been some instances, however, in which scholars have primarily focused on statutory
interpretation issues in lower federal courts. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and
Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012)
(addressing institutional differences between Supreme Court and lower federal court
interpretation); Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573 (1996) (examining empirical aspects of lower federal court interpretation); see also James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts:
Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1994) (addressing
interpretation of consumer protection laws in state and lower federal courts); Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV .
1215 (2012) (addressing different approaches to statutory interpretation by elected state
judges).
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level. Textualist Justices have argued strongly for an interpretive
approach that emphasizes the ordinary meaning of words and the
semantic structures of statutory text. They rely heavily on dictionaries and language canons to discern statutory meaning,5 and often
discount or reject committee reports and floor debates as superfluous or illegitimate.6 Purposive Justices have pushed back, contending that text is often less than conclusive and that considerations of
congressional intent and purpose require consulting legislative
history to help resolve ambiguities7 and to confirm or reinforce the
apparent meaning of text.8
This Article explores how judges in the courts of appeals approach
statutory interpretation under different terms of engagement. We
examine empirically whether circuit court judges embrace, or clash
over, interpretive theories as the Justices have so often done,
or—alternatively—whether they apply textualist and purposive
resources in ways that are more pragmatic, and less dogmatic, than
their Supreme Court counterparts. We also address normatively
whether courts of appeals ought to follow a more eclectic and adaptable interpretive approach, given the divergent institutional
realities under which they decide cases.
In a preliminary consideration of differences between circuit court
and Supreme Court approaches, we found that dictionary use in the
Supreme Court between 1986 and 2011 was substantially higher
than in circuit courts for the very same cases—that is, circuit court
decisions on which the Court had granted certiorari and reached
5. See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2001-04 (2012) (Alito,
J.) (relying on dictionary definitions); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-21
(2008) (Thomas, J.) (relying on ordinary meaning while invoking various language canons).
6. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-16, 119 (2001) (Kennedy, J.) (relying on language canons and declining to consider contrary legislative history in
the face of clear text); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-101 (1991) (Scalia,
J.) (rejecting consideration of legislative history as illegitimate when text is unambiguous).
7. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 70408 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (relying heavily on committee reports to support contested construction
of text); Casey, 499 U.S. at 112-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the Court must
remove “its thick grammarian’s spectacles” and not ignore legislative history when it provides
“persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose”).
8. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 457-58 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.) (relying
on committee report and drafting history to reinforce meaning of text); Small v. United States,
544 U.S. 385, 393 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (relying on committee and conference reports to confirm
meaning of text).
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decisions on the merits.9 We suggested that this difference might be
due to both political and institutional factors. The Court’s greater
political exposure may lead the Justices to invoke dictionaries as
part of an effort to deflect charges of judicial activism.10 In addition,
the more routinized aspects of circuit court review, combined with
the absence of permanent membership on particular circuit court
panels, may result in circuit courts adopting less of an institutional
culture regarding the use of specific interpretive resources such as
dictionaries.11
This Article reports on our more comprehensive and textured
effort to compare Supreme Court and appeals court usage of dictionaries and also legislative history. Our analyses are based on a
dataset comprised of federal appeals court decisions in three circuits
(Second, Seventh, and Tenth) covering three statutory subject areas
(criminal law, business and commercial law, and labor and employment law) from September 2005 through May 2015, as well as
Roberts Court decisions in the same three fields over the same time
period.
To summarize certain key findings at the outset, the Supreme
Court uses both dictionaries and legislative history considerably
more often than do the courts of appeals. In terms of balance between the two resources, the Court’s use of legislative history is only
modestly more frequent than its own dictionary use, whereas the
circuit courts are far more likely to use legislative history than
dictionaries. This substantially higher use of legislative history
relative to dictionaries by the courts of appeals is evident in all
three subject areas and in all three circuits.12 As a result, the gap
between the Supreme Court and courts of appeals in dictionary
usage is much greater than the gap in usage of legislative history.
This difference is also considerable for circuit court cases in which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then used the resource in
question: in such cases, the courts of appeals used legislative history

9. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Dictionaries 2.0: Exploring the Gap Between
the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, 125 YALE L.J.F. 104, 105 (2015) [hereinafter
Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0].
10. See id. at 115-16.
11. See id. at 117-19.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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more often than they used dictionaries.13 These findings lend strong
support to our previously expressed idea that a distinctive dictionary culture is prevalent in the current Supreme Court.14
Looking more closely at each interpretive resource, we found that
the relative frequency of dictionary use between the two court levels
varies considerably depending on the subject area and the type of
dictionary. Supreme Court dictionary use in criminal law decisions
is notably higher than in business and commercial or labor and
employment cases; by contrast, circuit court dictionary use in business and commercial law decisions is more than double that in
criminal or labor and employment cases.15 Moreover, in criminal law
cases the circuit courts often invoke dictionaries for de minimis
reasons; thus their reliance on cited definitions is considerably lower
than Supreme Court reliance in criminal law decisions. The
Supreme Court also uses general dictionaries over all three fields to
a much greater extent than legal dictionaries, whereas the courts of
appeals invoke legal dictionaries substantially more than general
dictionaries.16
With respect to legislative history, there are intriguing differences
in how legislative history is applied at the two judicial levels. The
Supreme Court is a much heavier user of what we call “vertical”
history. This is the record of changes in a statutory text—modified
over multiple Congresses (statutory history) or developed in
successive versions of a bill preceding enactment by one Congress
(drafting history)—as distinct from traditional legislative history
commentary that accompanies the development of a statutory text
(for example, committee reports and floor debates). Vertical history,
based on successive iterations of text rather than narrative explanations from legislative subgroups, is apparently more attractive (or
13. See infra Part II.A.3.
14. See generally James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme
Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM . & MARY L. REV. 483
(2013) [hereinafter Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage] (exploring the Justices’ dictionary
usage through empirical and doctrinal examination of majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions from 1986 to 2011).
15. See infra Table 2.
16. See infra Table 5. And, while the appeals courts tilt more heavily toward using
dictionaries published close to the time the controversy before the court was initiated, the
Supreme Court favors dictionaries published around the date a statute was enacted. See infra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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less unattractive) to textualist Justices than are other types of
legislative history. By contrast, the courts of appeals make only
modest use of vertical history, invoking traditional legislative history commentary on a far more regular basis.17 In addition, in criminal law cases the relative frequency of legislative history usage
among the circuits is associated with the distinctly higher proportion of white-collar criminal cases in the Second Circuit.
These divergent approaches—with marked variations based on
subject area, preference for general versus legal dictionaries, and
types of legislative history—undermine any notion that federal
courts are moving toward a uniform statutory interpretation approach. Instead, our findings suggest that something more protean
occurs in the courts of appeals. In Greek mythology, Proteus, an
early sea god, was a shape-shifter, capable of assuming many
forms.18 The adjective “protean” suggests versatility, adaptability,
and pragmatism, as distinct from more dogmatic or inflexible
interpretive approaches.
As we explain below, the circuit courts display a kind of pragmatic adaptability in their interpretive priorities, linked to factors
that we contend are institutional and resource-centric rather than
ideological or doctrine-driven. Their protean stance contrasts with
the Supreme Court’s more self-consciously strategic, and at times
dogmatic, approach to statutory interpretation. We believe the
appeals court approach reflects sound practical and reasonable
normative considerations that offer useful guidance for other lower
courts and perhaps for the Supreme Court as well.
In Part I, we propose certain factors that may help to differentiate
statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals—notably the presence of a repeat player effect at the Supreme Court, and the heightened levels of congressional and media
attention directed at the Justices both during and after the judicial
selection process. In Part II, we present our empirical findings,
summarized above, including the methods we used to assemble our
17. In addition, the circuit courts use Senate committee reports substantially more than
their House counterparts, whereas the Supreme Court invokes resources from both chambers
to roughly the same extent. See infra Table 6.
18. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 4, at 336-84 (Barry B. Powell trans., Oxford Univ. Press
2015) (“I will tell you all the tricks of this old man.... He will try everything, taking on the
form of all creeping things on the earth, and of water, and wondrous blazing fire.”).
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dataset. In Part III, we analyze our findings using illustrative
circuit court and Supreme Court decisions; we then explain why we
believe that—in partial contrast to the Supreme Court—the court
of appeals findings reflect an approach to statutory interpretation
that is protean and eclectic rather than doctrinaire or strategic. We
also suggest possible normative advantages to this protean
approach—from an epistemological standpoint, for its democratizing
influence, and as an ad hoc limitation on methodological stare
decisis.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR INTERPRETIVE DIVERGENCE
A range of factors may contribute to divergent interpretive approaches between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.
These factors reflect different institutional structures and operational realities at the two judicial levels.
A. The Limited Role of Hierarchical Instruction
Unlike the value of precedent in substantive law, the Supreme
Court’s approach to interpretive methodology is not likely to
dominate or substantially influence the ways that appeals courts
construe federal statutes. Initially, in contrast to constitutional
doctrine, Congress and agencies have created virtually all federal
statutory and regulatory law,19 and the Court has construed only a
very small fraction of these provisions. Lower courts may not receive
the same degree of methodological guidance as the Court has
provided with respect to constitutional interpretation, where it is
viewed as the predominant, if not exclusive, arbiter of methodology,
as well as meaning.20
19. Federal common law plays a rare, interstitial role in relation to this statutory setting.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (construing federal labor statute to authorize creation of federal common law for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements); Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943) (recognizing federal common law related to rights and duties of United States on
commercial paper which it issues).
20. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-21 (2013) (vacating lower federal court ruling for failure to apply correct standard of strict scrutiny under Equal Protection
Clause); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 299 (1984) (reversing
lower federal court ruling and upholding local regulation based on “reasonable time, place,
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An absence of explicit guidance for appeals courts might be less
important if the Supreme Court made its own methodological preferences clear. But in practice, although the Justices have frequently
taken self-consciously methodological positions, they have not set
forth a single interpretive methodology. To the contrary, in recent
decades they have articulated sharply divided views, ranging from
ardent textualism to respect for intentionalism or purposivism and
recognition of a consequentialist or pragmatic approach.21 These
diverse methodologies do little to predict, much less dictate, whether, how often, or to what extent judges should rely on dictionaries,
canons, legislative history, or a statute’s general purpose. Thus,
even if interpretive methodologies could be deemed tantamount to
precedent,22 there is nothing like that precedent to be found in
Supreme Court pronouncements.
Further, assuming arguendo that the Justices agreed on a
constructive role for particular resources, it is hard to fathom how
such statutory interpretive methods could be viewed as precedential
or manner” standard of First Amendment review); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
314-16 (1976) (per curiam) (reversing lower federal court ruling while declaring that rational
relation rather than strict scrutiny was the correct review standard under Equal Protection
Clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (reversing state supreme court ruling for
misapplying rational relation standard); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1941)
(affirming state supreme court ruling and upholding local ordinance against First Amendment
challenge, based on its being a content-neutral, time, place, and manner regulation of public
forum). See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227-28 (2015) (explaining
different First Amendment standards for content-based and content-neutral regulation of
speech).
21. Compare King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492-96 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.) (advancing
purposivist approach), with id. at 2496-502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advancing textualist
approach); compare Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301-05
(2011) (Thomas, J.) (advancing textualist approach), with id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (advancing pragmatic approach); compare Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 114-19 (2001) (Kennedy, J.) (advancing textualist approach), with id. at 124-29
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (advancing purposivist approach).
22. See Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (2014) (arguing that Chevron is an interpretive
precedent although no other statutory interpretation doctrines play that role, or even qualify
as “law”); see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
(demonstrating that interpretive dialogue in this area is characterized by sharp courtlegislature divisions more than inter-branch convergence toward a single precedential
approach); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction,
120 YALE L.J.F. 47 (2010) (criticizing the concept of judicial methodological consensus for
statutory interpretation cases).
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in the way that doctrine is. Most federal court opinions, at least at
appellate levels, employ multiple interpretive tools or resources.
They invoke ordinary meaning analysis; Supreme Court, circuit
court, or common law precedent; dictionary definitions; language or
substantive canons; specific legislative intent or general statutory
purpose, typically revealed through legislative history; agency
deference; or legislative inaction. The weight of each interpretive
method in contributing to a doctrinal result is almost invariably
uncertain. A language or substantive canon, or a Supreme Court or
common law precedent, or a dictionary definition, may be an
exclusive or primary cause, a supporting but ancillary cause, a confirmatory or reinforcing source, or mere window dressing—or it may
be used to deflect, dismiss, or rebut reliance by the losing side (represented by the nonprevailing party, a lower court, or the dissent).
Thus, unlike substantive “holdings” that become precedential
even if open to debate at the margins, it is not practicable to allocate
degrees of authoritative status to interpretive resources on a
systemic basis. And given the diversity of linguistic formulations in
our thousands of federal statutes, there is seemingly no possibility
of arriving at an authoritative hierarchy of interpretive resources
that can address the meaning of innumerable ambiguous texts. In
sum, the Hart and Sacks caveat set forth over half a century ago
remains applicable today:
Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation,
whether it is your own or somebody else’s, to be an accurate
statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard
truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation.23

One might imagine a limited role for interpretive precedent in
negative terms—if, for instance, the Court were to declare that
dictionaries or legislative history are irrelevant and start reversing
decisions that relied on them in any way. A comparable negative
rule was in place for centuries in Britain with respect to legislative
23. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Found. Press 1994) (1958).
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history: the courts followed an eighteenth-century precedent and
refused to consider parliamentary proceedings as an aid to statutory
construction.24 This precedent began to break down in the latter
decades of the last century and it eventually was overruled in
1992.25 Well before then, however, British judges admitted to consulting the parliamentary debates on their own and gleaning guidance from them albeit without references in their actual opinions.26
This practice of “peeking” at a forbidden resource suggests how even
negative interpretive precedent might be difficult, if not impossible,
to monitor in practical terms.
For all these reasons, one should expect that circuit court judges
have ample room to develop their own methodological approaches
when construing federal statutes, perhaps on field-specific as well
as case-by-case grounds.27
B. The Repeat Player Effect
In the Supreme Court, nine repeat players hear and decide all
cases together. In recent decades, there have been prolonged periods
of continuous membership without change. Over the first ten terms
of the Roberts Court (2005-2014), after Justice Alito succeeded
Justice O’Connor midway through the 2005 Term, there were only
two changes (Justice Sotomayor for Justice Souter in 2009; Justice
Kagan for Justice Stevens in 2010).28 Prior to the appointment of
Justices Roberts and Alito in 2005, the Court’s membership had not
changed at all for eleven terms—from 1994 through 2004.29 This
level of continuity permits and may encourage methodological
convergence, especially if one Justice forcefully stakes out a position
24. See Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B.); 4 Burr. 2303, 2332.
25. See Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) at 644-46 (Eng.).
26. See James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by the
House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH . U. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2007) (discussing remarks
of Lord Denning in a 1979 Court of Appeal decision).
27. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React
when the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN . L. REV. 481,
492 (2015) (concluding that key impediments to a lawlike approach to statutory interpretation
across the federal judicial hierarchy “stem from the Court’s own inconsistency and from the
inherently slippery, non-lawlike nature of many interpretive rules”).
28. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/H8D5-ZL6K].
29. See id.
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on the use or rejection of certain resources. Justice Scalia played
that role during his tenure on the Roberts Court (and also on the
Rehnquist Court) with respect to the increased reliance on dictionaries and diminished use of legislative history.30 Other Justices
may go along out of collegial respect or for strategic reasons.31
By contrast, appeals court judges sit in panels of three, comprising only a fraction (in some circuits a small fraction) of a circuit’s
total membership. The participation of senior and visiting judges
further increases what would be frequent shifts in panel composition in any event.32 Thus, there is relatively limited opportunity for
full-circuit conversation that might lead to consistency in methodological approaches. Moreover, in part because of earlier retirement,
there tends to be less continuity of membership in the courts of
appeals than in the Supreme Court. Of the three circuits we studied,
the Second and Tenth have had considerable turnover during our
ten-year period.33
The relative lack of participatory continuity hardly means that
circuit court judges are incapable of collective reflection about
interpretive methodologies. They presumably pay close attention to
30. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 160-71
(2008).
31. See id. at 162-70; see also Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 9, at 117.
32. See Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 9, at 117-18.
33. In the Second Circuit, of thirteen judges on active status in May 2015, seven were
active for the entire 2005-2015 period in which we gathered and analyzed decisions; the six
others were on active status for between four and eight years during this same period. See
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Second_Circuit [https://perma.cc/68LC-YJTP]. In
the Tenth Circuit, of twelve active status judges in May 2015, five were active for the entire
2005-2015 period; the seven others were on active status for between one and nine years in
this period. See United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Tenth_Circuit [https://perma.cc/
9G4L-FVG4]. Authoritative information on the tenure of judges in the Second, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits is available at History of the Federal Judiciary, Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED . JUD . CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.
html [https://perma.cc/8Q34-2Z44].
To be sure, senior circuit court judges may continue to contribute to jurisprudential
developments: the Second Circuit during this period, for example, included distinguished
senior judges Calabresi, Kearse, Leval, Newman, Walker, and Winter. See United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra. That said, the more infrequent and
intermittent participation by senior judges is likely to have some impact on the selfconsciousness and coherence of methodological exchanges when compared to the ongoing
dialogue among nine continuously sitting Justices.
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the development of substantive precedent within their own circuit;
it seems plausible to envision these judges focusing at times on
certain aspects of interpretive methodology in similar terms.
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit had the most continuity in
membership during our period of study.34 It also has included, for
more than three decades, Judges Posner and Easterbrook—two nationally renowned and widely respected jurists who have expressed
persistent methodological reservations about the use of dictionaries.35 We will explore in Part II whether their presence may have
had a special impact on dictionary use in the Seventh Circuit.
C. Resource Imbalance
Compared with the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court has a
less demanding caseload, greater access to law clerk and library
support, and a wealth of briefs from amici as well as parties. The
Court issues seventy to eighty total decisions with written opinions
every year.36 By contrast, in 2015, the active judges on our three
circuits participated in a substantially larger number of cases
decided on the merits, from a mean of 253 cases per judge in the
Tenth Circuit to 430 cases per judge in the Second Circuit.37 This
heavy volume means appeals courts are under pressure to decide
34. In the Seventh Circuit, eight of nine active status judges as of September 2015 were
active for the entire 2005-2015 period, and two vacant seats had formerly been filled by judges
who were active from 1995 to 2010 and from 2007 to February 2015. See United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_
of_Appeals_for_the_Seventh_Circuit [https://perma.cc/WZ7P-J2T4]. Four of the nine active
status judges began serving in the 1980s, and three more have been serving since the 1990s.
See id.
35. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
36. See The Justices’ Caseload, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
justicecaseload.aspx [https://perma.cc/3KF3-GC54].
37. The mean was 378 cases in the Seventh Circuit. These figures were calculated from
data on participations by active judges in fiscal year 2015. See ADMIN . OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015, at tbl.B-11 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/B11Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZT9-DCLQ]. Throughout that year, there
were thirteen active judges in the Second Circuit, nine in the Seventh Circuit, and twelve in
the Tenth Circuit. In the three circuits, all but two cases terminated on the merits in 2015
had signed or “reasoned, unsigned” opinions. See id. at tbl.B-12, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/B12Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F8Q-W5BK]. In terms of court-wide
comparisons, between 2005 and 2014 our three courts of appeals decided on average almost
600 cases per circuit each year in the three subject fields alone. Complete data on cases and
fields are on file with the authors.
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cases without spending much time reflecting on or wrestling with
methodological approaches. In addition, lawyer participation is often not of the same quality or quantity as in the Supreme Court; for
instance, there are comparatively few amicus briefs.38 Some scholars
have suggested that this could lead to a larger differential in the use
of labor-intensive resources such as legislative history,39 although
not necessarily in the use of “less expensive” resources like dictionaries.
D. Congressional and Media Attention
The visibility of Supreme Court decisions is high, and Justices
may feel obligated, if not constrained, to defend against judicial
activism critiques. Scholars have shown that in recent decades,
congressional overrides have been especially frequent in the areas
of civil rights/workplace equality and criminal law/habeas procedure, responding to liberal Supreme Court decisions in criminal law
and to conservative Supreme Court decisions in civil rights.40 These
are fields in which media interest and ideological tensions may
make the Justices especially sensitive. Not surprisingly, appeals
court judges are less well-known, and their decisions are comparatively less scrutinized. This might lead to less frequent invocation
of certain putatively neutral resources like dictionaries (or canons,
which we did not examine) in such highly visible fields.
On the other hand, one social science study of congressional
responses to circuit court decisions found that congressional overrides came most often (55 percent) in the economic regulatory area,
and they occurred more quickly than was true for the Supreme
Court.41 And there is some additional evidence that Congress is not
38. See Bruhl, supra note 4, at 470-72.
39. See id. at 473-75; Nehf, supra note 4, at 5-6.
40. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1356-61
(2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 343-45 (1991).
41. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal
Circuit Court Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61, 65 (2001) (reporting that the issue area for 55.5
percent of appeals court cases generating congressional response from 1990 to 1998 was
economic activity (environment, bankruptcy, or other), versus 8.6 percent arising in criminal
law issue area, and 5 percent in civil rights area). The study reported that 47 percent of all
overrides during this period occurred within two years of a circuit court decision, and 81
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shy about overriding circuit court decisions construing commercial/economic regulatory provisions.42 Perhaps legislators, and the
regulated communities that lobby them, pay special attention to
these types of economic regulatory cases in the courts of appeals,
decisions that may have substantial impact even though (or partly
because) the vast majority will never reach the Supreme Court. If
“judicial activism” is an inherently subjective concept, based on perceptions from some relevant audience, then the most responsive
legislative audiences for Supreme Court decisions may differ by field
from the audiences for appeals court cases.
E. The Judicial Selection Process
Professors Aaron Bruhl and Ethan Leib have marshaled arguments in support of a certain degree of interpretive divergence between federal court and state court judges when elected state court
judges construe statutes.43 They suggest that a judge’s democratically chosen status may justify her in according relatively less
weight to stare decisis considerations, and correspondingly more
weight to dynamic interpretation—taking greater account of current
social values and legislative preferences than may be appropriate
for unelected federal judges.44
In addition to the institutional and operational differences we
have articulated to this point, Bruhl and Leib’s focus on divergent
methods of judicial selection may be instructive. Differences in the
selection of Supreme Court and court of appeals judges are not as
stark as those between elected and appointed judges, but they have
their own implications for modes of legal interpretation. Just as
Supreme Court decisions garner special political and media attenpercent within five years. See id. This rate of override was generally faster than what
occurred in the Supreme Court in the 1980s, as revealed by the Eskridge Yale study. Cf.
Eskridge, supra note 40, at 345.
42. See Eskridge, supra note 40, at 424-27 (listing more than twenty court of appeals
decisions construing economic regulatory statutes that were overridden by Congress between
1967 and 1990).
43. See Bruhl & Leib, supra note 4, at 1237-53. Bruhl and Leib recognize that a federal
judge’s job involves statutory interpretation to a greater degree than a state judge’s—the
latter deals more regularly with common law issues. Id. at 1241. Their focus is on areas of
overlap between the two types of judges regarding interpretation of statutes.
44. See id. at 1257-59.
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tion, so too the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation
processes are more ideologically high-profile and politically
polarized than those processes are for court of appeals judges.
One possible consequence is that candidates for the Supreme
Court are required to articulate and defend “neutral” interpretive
philosophies, and to repudiate any dynamic or other “unconventional” interpretive impulses as antidemocratic.45 These confirmation exchanges—reported in detail by mainstream and specialized
media—may contribute to the candidates acquiring methodological
labels that follow them, albeit at times subtly, onto the High Court
bench.46 Moreover, once on the Court, Justices in recent times have
continued to expound on their interpretive philosophies through
extrajudicial speeches and media appearances—at times defending
their own neutrality while criticizing colleagues for judicial activism.47

45. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Image Is Everything: Politics, Umpiring, and the Judicial
Myth, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 398 (2016) (emphasizing “[t]he important consideration
... that judges (and umpires) who are believed to be doing no more than applying the law w[ill]
escape some of the controversy and criticism that they might receive if the full scope of their
discretion were realized”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1292 & n.249 (2009) (citing to Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
exchanges between senators from both parties and Supreme Court nominees Justice Breyer
in 1994 and Justice Ginsburg in 1993, focused on value of legislative history); James J.
Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 174 & n.91
(2003) (citing to hearing and floor statements by senators from both parties from 1987 to
2001, related to Supreme Court confirmation processes and emphasizing the importance of
neutral interpretation of the law).
46. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005)
(statement of C.J. John Roberts) (reporting that judges have the limited role of umpires,
whose job is to see that everyone plays by the rules, and that ”[n]obody ever went to a ball
game to see the umpire”; adding that judges have no agenda or platform and simply decide
every case based on the record and according to the rule of law); The Nomination of Elena
Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 202-03 (2010) (statement of J. Elena Kagan) (reporting
that Chief Justice Roberts’s umpire metaphor is correct in important respects, including the
judge not having a team in the game and judges realizing that their role is a limited one
because the real policymakers are in Congress and the executive branch; adding that the calls
Justices make are not easy ones and their exercise of judgment requires listening hard to each
side and “cast[ing] each argument in the best possible light”).
47. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition, 19 GREEN
BAG 2D 157, 169-72 (2016).
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Appeals court judges are not immune from such confirmationrelated attention or post-appointment celebrity. At the same time,
their interpretive approaches generally receive far less congressional, interest group, or media scrutiny. This may, in turn, result in
their feeling less constrained or self-conscious as they subsequently
develop their own approaches to statutory construction problems
and challenges—contributing, albeit in ways that would be difficult
to measure, to more eclectic and adaptable interpretive perspectives.
Some of these factors may have more explanatory value than
others. We will cross-reference or incorporate certain factors as we
present and then analyze our results. But one important takeaway
at the outset is the likelihood of a genuine divergence between
statutory interpretation methods at the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals.
Before we turn to our empirical examination, it is worth identifying possible normative implications flowing from the likelihood of
interpretive divergence between the two judicial levels. First, one
might contend that courts of appeals have an obligation to not
disregard clear Supreme Court methodological priorities because
such priorities should serve essentially as rules of recognition in the
statutory field. We do not find this contention overly persuasive.
Apart from the reality that the Justices have never agreed on such
clear priorities,48 we would be reluctant to endorse a rule-like approach emanating from Supreme Court experience, given that the
Court’s cases are atypical in their contestation, complexity, and
policy implications. These cases are the tip of an enormous appellate
decisional iceberg, just as the Justices who decide them operate in
an institutional climate that differs substantially from the one
facing federal appeals court judges.49 Accordingly, one should
48. Of course, the Justices and appeals court judges do agree that in a statutory interpretation setting one should start by carefully examining the text. In this respect, Justice Scalia
has helped generate a renewed understanding that “we are all textualists now.” See Justice
Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discussesstatutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/9ZL7-UZZG]. That said, there remain abiding
differences among the Justices as to the extent that text may be mediated by considerations
of congressional purpose or intent, the relative importance of dictionaries, the varied roles of
language and substantive canons, and the weight given to legislative history.
49. See supra Parts I.B-E (addressing repeat player effect, resources imbalance, con-
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hesitate to adopt an inflexible or prescriptive methodological
approach based on this small subset of decisions generated in a
unique context.
A more intriguing and important normative question (at least to
us) is whether, assuming appeals courts turn out to be pragmatic
and adaptable—and less dogmatic—than the Supreme Court in
their interpretive methods, such a protean approach is preferable to
a more self-consciously strategic or opinionated one. We will defer
a response to this question until the end of our next two Parts,
which identify the contours of divergence between the two judicial
levels in empirical and doctrinal terms.
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical analyses in this Part provide a range of findings
about comparative usage of dictionaries and legislative history. We
believe these analyses offer valuable information in themselves,
although not all findings are directly relevant to the protean theme
set forth in the earlier discussion.
Our findings focus on two types of differences in statutory
interpretation approach between the Supreme Court and the courts
of appeals. We assess the comparative magnitude of resources used.
Does the Supreme Court use dictionaries and legislative history
more often than the appeals courts do, and how do these differences
in usage vary between fields?50 Likewise, are there differences in
magnitude with respect to certain attributes of usage, such as
general versus legal dictionaries, or particular types of legislative
history?51 We also assess the comparative balance between the two
resources. Is the gap between Supreme Court use of dictionaries and
legislative history larger or smaller than the gap between circuit
court use of those two resources?52 And does the ratio of legislative
history use to dictionary use differ among circuits as well as between the circuits taken together and the Supreme Court?53

gressional and media attention, and judicial selection process).
50. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
51. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.2.
52. See infra Part II.A.3.
53. See infra Part II.C.1.
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Finally, our findings address separately certain differences in dictionary and legislative history use among the three circuits.54 These
differences are not central to our goal of comparing interpretive
approaches at the two judicial levels. At the same time, identifying
and describing the differences allows us to consider the possibility
that individual circuits may be shaped by outspoken appeals court
judges acting on their methodological preferences in ways that are
analogous to what we have noted is present at the Supreme Court
level.
To probe the use of dictionary definitions and legislative history
in statutory interpretation, we analyzed opinions in the Supreme
Court and three federal courts of appeals in statutory cases over a
period of approximately one decade: the 2005-2014 Terms of the
Supreme Court and decisions handed down from September 2005
through May 2015 in the courts of appeals. The three courts of
appeals that we include in the study are the Second, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits. We selected those circuits largely for their geographical and demographic diversity. However, we were also interested in
the Second and Seventh Circuits because of their high prestige and
the prominence of some of their judges as advocates for particular
approaches to statutory interpretation.55
Our study includes three statutory areas: criminal law, business
and commercial law, and labor and employment law.56 These fields,
which were also the subjects of our earlier studies of dictionary
use,57 cover a large share of the statutory landscape and include a
diverse range of relationships involving government and private
parties.58

54. See infra Part II.D.
55. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN , JUDGING STATUTES (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK (2008); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994).
56. For definitions of the three fields, see Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note
14, at 496 n.25.
57. See id. at 488; Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 9, at 104.
58. Criminal law involves substantial prosecutorial resources brought against individuals,
many of whom lack comparable resources. Business and commercial law (hereinafter referred
to simply as “commercial law”) often involves two well-resourced institutional parties in an
arm’s length relationship, although government and individuals also appear. Labor and
employment law is a more ideologically charged field than the other two; parties’ resources
in general are more equal than in criminal law, but less balanced than in commercial law.
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We analyze two broad issues regarding dictionaries and legislative history: the use vel non of these interpretive resources, and
certain specific attributes of dictionaries and legislative history
when these resources are being used. In Section A, we examine the
extent to which the Supreme Court and three appeals courts use
dictionary definitions and legislative history in their majority
opinions. In Section B, we explore various attributes of the interpretive resources that the courts use, such as types of dictionaries and
sources of legislative history. In Section C, we pull together the
evidence on differences between the Supreme Court and courts of
appeals from the two prior sections and consider the sources of these
differences. Finally, in Section D, we present an overview and
analysis of similarities and differences among the three courts of
appeals that we have examined.
For the Supreme Court, our analysis is based on the universe of
cases in the three fields that were decided with full opinions. We
identified the majority opinions that used an interpretive resource
from a reading of the full set of 231 statutory decisions in the 20052014 Terms that met our criteria for inclusion: 94 in the field of
criminal law, 50 in the field of commercial law, and 87 in the field
of labor and employment law.
For the courts of appeals, the denominator of reported decisions
numbered in the thousands for our three circuits over the ten-year
period.59 For each circuit/field combination, we used search terms to
identify majority opinions officially published in the West Reporter
system60 in which a court might have cited dictionary definitions or
legislative history in the process of resolving a statutory question.61
We then analyzed a stratified sample of these cases—reading every
fourth case that was identified for legislative history and every
fourth case identified for dictionary use, in order to determine in
which of those cases the majority opinion actually cited that
59. We created the denominator datasets based essentially on reported cases presenting
legal issues arising under 18 U.S.C. (criminal law), 15 U.S.C. (commercial law), and 29/42
U.S.C. (labor and employment law). We identified over 1800 Second Circuit reported cases,
over 3000 Seventh Circuit reported cases, and over 1500 Tenth Circuit reported cases in these
fields.
60. The decisions appear in F.3d volumes from 422 F.3d 1155 (Sept. 2, 2005) to 784 F.3d
1123 (May 1, 2015).
61. Search terms used to locate dictionary and legislative history usage in each of the
three circuits and the three fields are on file with the authors.
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resource in relation to statutory interpretation in the particular
field.62 When an opinion did not meet the identified criterion, it was
replaced with the next case that did so.63 In calculating the proportions of majority opinions that used dictionary definitions or
legislative history, we corrected for imperfections in the search
procedure that produced “false positives” and “false negatives.”64
We examined the majority opinions in our initial samples that
actually used either a dictionary or legislative history in order to
analyze how courts of appeals employed the two resources. Altogether, we reviewed 182 cases in which a court cited legislative
history. Of these cases, 86 were from the Second Circuit, 50 from the
Seventh Circuit, and 46 from the Tenth Circuit; 99 cases were in
criminal law, 46 in commercial law, and 37 in labor and employment
law. For dictionary definitions we reviewed a total of 88 cases.65 Of
these cases, 33 were from the Second Circuit, 24 from the Seventh
62. Our research assistant, Amy Torres, read every fourth case. One of the authors also
read more than three-fourths of these numerator cases in order to review and make minor
coding adjustments as needed. The other author read a smaller sample of the numerator
decisions. The cases were listed by citation in the Federal Reporter, so they were in rough
chronological order.
63. Cases did not meet the identified criteria for one of two reasons: either the case did
not actually fall into one of our three statutory fields even though a relevant U.S.C. reference
appeared somewhere in the majority opinion, or (less often) the case did not actually involve
the use of a dictionary or legislative history.
64. False positives were opinions that were identified by the search criteria for a resource
but that did not actually involve use of that resource. (Cases that turned out not to fall into
one of the three subject matter fields were not used in the analysis of that field, but they were
not counted as false positives if they did use the resource in question.) False negatives were
cases in which our search terms did not identify use of a resource but in which it was actually
used. We identified false negatives by reading cases in which the search terms indicated that
one resource was used but not the other. If our reading indicated that the other resource was
used, as happened in a small proportion of cases, then the case was a false negative.
For each resource, we started out with the proportion of cases in which the search terms
indicated that the resource was used. We multiplied this proportion by [one minus the false
positive rate] and then by [one plus the false negative rate] to obtain our estimate of the
actual usage rate. For each resource, the false positive rates were separately calculated for
each combination of circuit and field of law; because of the smaller number of cases on which
it was based, a single false negative rate was calculated for each resource. Our estimates of
usage rates for the courts of appeals are necessarily inexact, so we do not ascribe any substantive significance to small differences between fields or courts. Of course, the need to estimate
usage rates in the courts of appeals has no impact on the analysis of the ways in which
interpretive resources are used, including reliance on those resources and other attributes of
usage.
65. With respect to both dictionaries and legislative history, the total number of cases
using each resource in our three fields is roughly four times the number of cases we reviewed.
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Circuit, and 31 from the Tenth Circuit; 51 were in criminal law, 20
in commercial law, and 17 in labor and employment law. Except
where noted, our analyses of the practices of courts and individual
judges are based solely on majority (or in rare instances, plurality)
opinions.
A. Supreme Court Versus Courts of Appeals: Usage and Reliance
1. Dictionary Use and Reliance
As shown in Table 1, the Supreme Court cites dictionaries in a
much higher proportion of its majority opinions than do the courts
of appeals—nearly four times as frequently.66 The disparity between
the two levels of courts is smallest in commercial law, the field in
which dictionary use is most common in the courts of appeals and
least common in the Supreme Court.67 In criminal law and labor
and employment, the difference is considerably greater.68 There are
some substantial differences among the three circuits in rates of
dictionary citations, both overall and in specific fields—differences
that we will discuss later in this Part.69 But each of the three
circuits fell far short of the Supreme Court in overall usage of
dictionaries, with the Tenth Circuit having the highest rate at 11.9
percent.70
66. Throughout this Part, our interpretations of patterns of dictionary and legislative
history usage are informed by the statistical significance of differences between the two
judicial levels and among circuits and fields of law. We do not refer to significance at these
various points, however, in an effort to present and discuss results in a clear and concise
manner. Moreover, there is good reason not to rely heavily on tests of significance in interpretation of findings. See, e.g., Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA’s Statement
on p-Values: Context, Process, and Purpose, 70 AM . STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). All calculations
of significance are on file with the authors.
67. See infra Table 1.
68. See infra Table 1. If we divide the decade in half, the citation rate in the Supreme
Court for the 2005-2009 Terms was 27.0 percent, compared with 29.3 percent in the 20102014 Terms. Thus, it appears that the growing rate of dictionary citations in the Court has
stabilized at its historically high level. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14,
at 495-97. Our method for estimating usage rates in the courts of appeals does not allow for
a confident judgment about trends within the decade-long period.
69. See infra Part II.D.
70. See infra Table 1. In all tabulations of the overall frequency with which courts of
appeals cite to resources, criminal cases have a highly disproportionate effect because those
cases are far more common in the lower federal courts than are cases that fall in the other two
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Table 1. Percentages of Majority Opinions in Statutory Decisions
Citing Dictionary Definitions, Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals, 2005-2015

Supreme Court
Courts of Appeals
2d Circuit
7th Circuit
10th Circuit

Criminal
34.0

Commercial
22.0

Labor &
Employment
25.3

Total
28.1

6.9
9.9

14.8
16.5

5.8
8.2

7.6
10.8

4.0
10.0

7.6
27.0

2.9
12.5

4.0
11.9

When a majority opinion cited a dictionary, we determined whether that opinion actually relied on one or more dictionary definitions
as a basis for the court’s decision.71 Where the Supreme Court did
cite dictionary definitions, it was highly likely to rely on one or more
of those definitions as at least a partial basis for its ruling—82
percent of the time. Courts of appeals were somewhat less likely to
rely on a definition they cited—73 percent of the time.72 Thus, the
disparity between the two levels regarding reliance on dictionaries
as part of decision-making was even larger than the overall rate of
citation suggests.
In this respect as well, there was considerable variation across
the three fields of law. Supreme Court reliance on a cited definition
was highest in absolute terms and relative to the courts of appeals
in criminal law (94 percent, versus 71 percent in the courts of apfields and thus, criminal cases appear more often in our samples of cases estimating usage
rates for dictionaries and legislative history.
71. We used the same criterion for reliance on legislative history. See infra Part II.A.2.
72. These proportions are equivalent (taking rounding error into account) to the percentages of decisions with reliance on dictionaries shown in Table 2 divided by the percentages
using dictionaries at all, shown in Table 1. The rate for the courts of appeals is substantially
higher than the 40.8 percent reliance rate that we found for courts of appeals in Dictionaries
2.0, supra note 9, at 112-13. The magnitude of the difference is likely a product of three
factors: (1) the universe of Dictionaries 2.0 cases spanned a much larger period, from 19862011, and Rehnquist-era circuit court dictionary cases may well have had a different reliance
rate; (2) the cases in the Dictionaries 2.0 setting arose in all twelve circuits, unlike the
narrower range of circuits we coded here; and (3) there were only 24 appeals court cases using
dictionaries in the earlier dataset (17 percent of 109, plus 5.2 percent of 106) whereas our
universe here is much larger—88 cases using dictionaries. See generally id. at 110 tbl.1, 112
tbl.2 (providing scope of earlier research).
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peals). The rate of reliance was about the same in labor and
employment (73 percent in the Supreme Court, versus 71 percent in
the courts of appeals). But in commercial law, courts of appeals were
substantially more likely to rely on a cited dictionary definition
than was the Supreme Court (80 percent, versus 64 percent). We
can calculate the proportions of all majority opinions that relied on
a dictionary definition as a basis for decision by multiplying the
citation rate by the reliance rate. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Percentages of Majority Opinions in Statutory Decisions
Relying on Dictionary Definitions, Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals, 2005-2015
Labor &
Employment

Criminal

Commercial

31.9
4.9

14.0
11.8

18.4
4.1

22.9
5.5

2d Circuit
7th Circuit

5.8
2.1

9.9
7.6

5.5
2.3

6.5
2.7

10th Circuit

9.5

27.0

8.3

10.8

Supreme Court
Courts of Appeals

Total

Thus, when we take reliance into account, the gap between the
two levels of courts remains about the same in labor and employment and grows in criminal law. But the gap narrows in commercial
law—enough that there is little difference in rates of dictionary
reliance between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.73
The contrast between commercial law and the two other fields is
striking.
In addition to comparing overall frequency of dictionary usage at
the two judicial levels, we also compared the average number of
dictionary citations in majority opinions that use dictionaries at all.
The mean number of citations was somewhat higher in the Supreme
Court (2.22) than in the courts of appeals (1.78), so use of this measure increased the disparity between the two levels in dictionary
use.74 However, commercial cases were an exception: because the
73. See supra Table 2.
74. The ratio between the two levels in total numbers of dictionary citations was 4.6:1,
compared with 3.7:1 for proportions of majority opinions using dictionaries. The ratio was
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mean number of citations was somewhat higher for the courts of
appeals in these cases, the disparity between the two levels was
further reduced when the number of citations was taken into account.75
The appeals courts’ distinctive dictionary approach in commercial
law decisions is also evident in legislative history usage, as noted in
Table 3 below. The circuit courts invoke legislative history in commercial law decisions well over twice as often as they do in criminal
or labor and employment majority opinions. As we discuss in Part
III, these findings, in conjunction with some others, suggest that
circuit courts may be especially pragmatic (and less formalistic)
than the Supreme Court in their quest for the meaning of key terms
arising in complex commercial settings.
Among those opinions that rely on dictionary definitions as a
basis for their conclusions, a small number treat one or more definitions as conclusive and thus as a barrier to further analysis of the
meaning of a statutory provision.76 Although the use of dictionaries
as a barrier is relatively rare in both levels of courts, it is more
common and more powerfully applied in the Supreme Court. That
difference, which accentuates the larger role of dictionaries in the
Supreme Court, will be considered further in Part III.
2. Legislative History Use and Reliance
As Table 3 shows, there was a substantial gap between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals in citation of legislative
history, in the same direction as the gap in dictionary citations. And
as with dictionaries, we found that appeals court judges used legislative history far more often in commercial law than they did in the
other two fields—and, for legislative history, at the same rate as the
Supreme Court.

more than five times as high in labor and employment (7.7:1) and criminal law (7.6:1) as it
was in commercial law (1.4:1).
75. The ratio between the two levels in total numbers of citations in commercial cases was
1.35:1, compared with 1.49:1 for proportions of majority opinions using dictionaries.
76. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 555-64 (reviewing cases in
which the Supreme Court used dictionary definitions as a bar to consideration of certain other
interpretive sources).
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Table 3. Percentages of Majority Opinions in Statutory Decisions
Citing Legislative History, Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals,
2005-2015

Criminal

Commercial

Labor &
Employment

Supreme Court

35.1

36.0

33.3

34.6

Courts of Appeals

14.1

36.5

13.2

16.5

28.2

45.2

21.6

30.0

2d Circuit

Total

7th Circuit

7.6

22.0

7.3

8.8

10th Circuit

14.4

47.3

21.9

18.6

When majority opinions did cite legislative history, they generally relied on at least one piece of that history as a basis for their
rulings. The rate for the Supreme Court was slightly higher: 82.5
percent, compared with 77.5 percent for the courts of appeals across
all three fields. In the courts of appeals the rate of reliance, like the
rate of citation, was highest in commercial cases (84.8 percent), compared with 75.8 percent in criminal cases and 73.0 percent in labor
and employment.77 In the Supreme Court, the rate of reliance varied
substantially among fields (unlike the citation rates, which were
virtually identical). Reliance was very high for commercial law (94.4
percent) and criminal law (87.9 percent) but considerably lower for
labor and employment law (69.0 percent). Thus, in commercial law
cases, the proportion of decisions that relied on legislative history
was similar in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, while
the difference in reliance was considerably greater in the two other
fields.

77. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
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Table 4. Percentages of Majority Opinions in Statutory Decisions
Relying on Legislative History, Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals, 2005-2015

Supreme Court
Courts of Appeals
2d Circuit
7th Circuit
10th Circuit

Criminal
30.9

Commercial
34.0

Labor &
Employment
23.0

10.7
21.5

31.0
38.0

9.6
17.2

12.8
23.7

5.4
11.6

22.0
33.1

4.3
17.5

6.5
14.6

Total
28.6

When a majority opinion used legislative history, on average the
Supreme Court cited more types of legislative history (mean of 1.90)
than did the courts of appeals (1.43).78 This difference occurred in
all three fields. Thus, as was true of dictionary citations, the ratio
between the two levels in total citations to legislative history by this
measure was somewhat higher than the ratio for the proportion of
opinions citing legislative history.79
3. Legislative History Usage Versus Dictionary Usage
All three courts of appeals in our study cited legislative history
more frequently than dictionaries.80 The ratios range from 1.6:1 in
the Tenth Circuit, to 2.2:1 in the Seventh Circuit, to 2.8:1 in the
Second Circuit. The Supreme Court also cited legislative history
more frequently than dictionaries, but the ratio is much smaller—a
little over 1.2:1.
If we compare the frequency with which opinions cite and actually
rely on these resources, the ratios favoring legislative history reliance range from 1.4:1 in the Tenth Circuit, to 2.4:1 in the Seventh

78. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
79. The ratio between the two levels for this measure of legislative history citations was
2.8:1, compared with 2.1:1 for proportions of majority opinions citing legislative history. The
ratio between the two levels was more than twice as high in labor and employment (2.9:1) and
criminal law (3.4:1) as in commercial law (1:4.1).
80. Compare supra Table 3, with supra Table 1.
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Circuit, to 3.6:1 in the Second Circuit.81 Once again, the ratio is
lowest, 1.2:1, for the Supreme Court.82
The overall difference in usage is largely reproduced when we
compare rates for circuit court cases of similar “importance”—those
on which the Court granted certiorari and proceeded to invoke legislative history or a dictionary in its majority opinion. For Supreme
Court majority opinions in our three fields that used legislative
history between 2005 and 2015, the appeals court cases invoked
legislative history 37.5 percent of the time.83 By contrast, for Supreme Court majorities that cited to dictionaries during this same
ten-year period of the Roberts Court, appeals court cases used
dictionaries 27.5 percent of the time.84
On the other hand, the courts of appeals used dictionaries almost
four times as often and legislative history more than twice as often
in the subset of cases on which certiorari was granted, compared to
all cases in our three fields.85 Moreover, the ratio between the proportion of court of appeals opinions using legislative history and the
proportion using dictionaries is smaller for the certiorari-granted
cases (1.36:1) than for the sample of all appeals court cases in our
three fields (2.17:1).
One possible explanation for the large increase in use of both
dictionaries and legislative history is a judicially perceived greater
need for interpretive resources than is true for the average case decided by the courts of appeals. Assuming some level of awareness
from circuit court judges (as well as attorneys briefing the cases)

81. Compare supra Table 4, with supra Table 2.
82. The ratios for citation and reliance are the same for the Supreme Court because, when
the Court did cite one of these resources, it was equally likely to rely on legislative history as
it was to rely on dictionary definitions.
83. Of the 80 cases in which Supreme Court majority opinions used legislative history, appeals court majority opinions also invoked legislative history in 10 of 33 criminal law cases,
4 of 18 commercial law cases, and 16 of 29 labor and employment cases.
84. Of the 65 Supreme Court cases in which majority opinions used dictionaries, appeals
court majority opinions had also invoked dictionaries in 7 of 32 criminal cases, 3 of 11 commercial cases, and 8 of 22 labor and employment cases. Court of appeals cases in labor and
employment law had the highest frequency of both legislative history and dictionary use in
our Supreme Court-based sample.
85. The proportions in certiorari-granted cases are 37.5 percent for legislative history and
27.5 percent for dictionaries. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. The proportions
are 16.5 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively, for the sample of all court of appeals opinions.
Compare supra Table 3, with supra Table 1.

2017]

PROTEAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

711

that there is or could be a circuit split resulting in a possible grant
of certiorari, judges (and their law clerks) may be especially inclined
to look for every interpretive resource that might be helpful. This
keener appetite would tend to result in wider net-casting for resource assistance than occurs in run-of-the-mill appeals court cases,
leading perhaps to some reduction in the ordinary degree of variation in use of different interpretive resources.
Further, in cases in which a certiorari grant seems like a real
possibility, judges may be more drawn—even if subconsciously—to
use dictionaries, an interpretive resource in vogue with the current
Supreme Court. One might regard this as an adaptation by the circuits to the methodological preferences of the Justices for the small
subset of cases in which intercircuit contests are likely to receive
Supreme Court attention.
Returning to comparisons involving all appeals court cases, the
relative frequencies with which the courts of appeals used dictionaries and legislative histories across the three subject fields did not
differ a great deal. Again, there was more use of legislative history
than dictionaries—from 2.5:1 to 2.0:1 for citation and from 2.6:1
to 2.2:1 for reliance.86 As much as the three fields varied in the
absolute frequency with which judges used legislative history and
dictionary definitions, the tendency to employ one or the other was
more or less constant.
B. Supreme Court Versus Courts of Appeals: Attributes of Usage
1. Dictionary Usage Patterns
In this Section and the one that follows, we focus on the cases in
which majority opinions actually used a dictionary or legislative
history. Our interest is in the specific sources that courts used and
in the ways that their opinions employed the resources they used.
Majority opinions that used dictionaries did so for only a single
word 63 percent of the time in the Supreme Court and 69 percent in
the courts of appeals. It was uncommon to turn to dictionaries to

86. For citation, the ratios are 2.0:1 for criminal, 2.5:1 for commercial, and 2.3:1 for labor
and employment. For reliance, the ratios are 2.2:1 for criminal, 2.6:1 for commercial, and 2.4:1
for labor and employment.
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define more than two words: 6 percent of the time in the Supreme
Court and 9 percent in the courts of appeals.87
More significant is the number of dictionaries cited for individual
words. Do opinions turn to a single dictionary, or do they look to
multiple dictionaries88 to get a broader picture of the way that a
word is defined? In the Supreme Court, a small majority of words
were defined on the basis of a single dictionary (52.7 percent); in the
courts of appeals, the overwhelming majority of words (82.9 percent)
had citations to only a single dictionary. Correspondingly, the mean
number of dictionaries cited per word was 1.75 in the Supreme
Court and 1.24 in the courts of appeals. These figures suggest that
both Justices and judges typically engage in only a limited search
for the dictionary meaning of a word in question. It also suggests an
especially cursory search process for appeals court judges, although
the categories of dictionaries being used at the two judicial levels
explain some of the difference in mean numbers.89
We divided dictionaries into three categories: general meaning
(for example, the various Webster’s and the Oxford English Dictionary), legal meaning (for example, Black’s), and technical meaning
(for example, medical). Citations to technical meaning dictionaries
were relatively rare, occurring in less than 10 percent of the
opinions that use dictionaries of any type. As set forth in Table 5,
general meaning and legal dictionaries are far more frequent at
both court levels, but their relative frequencies are quite different.
The Supreme Court cited general dictionaries three times as often
as legal dictionaries, but courts of appeals cited legal dictionaries
somewhat more often than general dictionaries—although Second
Circuit judges showed more interest in general dictionaries than
their colleagues in the two other circuits.

87. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
88. In our analyses, distinct editions of the same dictionary were treated as multiple
dictionaries.
89. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining part of this gap as due to the
courts of appeals’ tendency to cite legal dictionaries more often than general meaning dictionaries, noting that the universe of cited legal dictionaries is essentially restricted to Black’s).
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Table 5. Percentages of Dictionary Citations to General and Legal
Dictionaries90
Court
Supreme Court
Courts of Appeals
2d Circuit
7th Circuit
10th Circuit

General Meaning
71.8

Legal Meaning
23.3

42.0
49.1

52.9
45.5

38.9
37.9

52.8
59.1

Because judges and Justices tend to cite multiple general dictionaries more often than they do multiple legal dictionaries, it is
useful to look as well at the frequency with which opinions cite any
dictionaries of either type. General meaning dictionaries were used
82 percent of the time in the Supreme Court but only 43 percent of
the time in the courts of appeals. In contrast, legal meaning dictionaries were used 69 percent of the time in the courts of appeals
but only 38 percent of the time in the Supreme Court.91 In the
Supreme Court, the rate of use for general meaning dictionaries was
uniform across the three fields. For the courts of appeals, however,
that rate was appreciably higher in commercial law than in criminal
law or labor and employment law. Related to this higher rate of
general dictionary use, courts of appeals used multiple dictionaries
to define a word considerably more often in commercial law than in
the other two fields.92
When judges and Justices turned to legal dictionaries, it was
nearly always to one or more editions of Black’s, which accounted for
95 percent of the citations to legal dictionaries in our sample of
90. Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because citations to technical dictionaries
are not included.
91. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors. As adverted to in supra note
89, this difference in the balance between general and legal meaning dictionaries explains
part of the difference in the average number of dictionaries cited per word between the two
levels, because there is a stronger tendency to cite only a single legal dictionary (typically, one
edition of Black’s) than to cite only a single general meaning dictionary.
92. The rates of use for general meaning dictionaries were 65 percent for commercial law,
versus 41 percent in labor and employment and 35 percent in criminal law. Correspondingly,
the frequency with which courts of appeals used multiple dictionaries to define a word was
30 percent in commercial law, contrasted with 16 percent in criminal law and 13 percent in
labor and employment law. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
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cases. There is a much wider range of choice among general
dictionaries, and usage patterns reflect that range. We kept a count
of citations to the Oxford English Dictionary, Webster’s Second,
Webster’s Third, and American Heritage, with citations to other general dictionaries placed in an “other” category. No single dictionary
accounted for as much as one-third of the citations of general
dictionaries in either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals.
The distribution of dictionaries within this category was similar
in the two levels, with one striking exception: appeals court judges
used Webster’s Second only once in our sample of cases, while onefifth of all general citations in the Supreme Court were to Webster’s
Second.93 In part, that difference stems from Justice Scalia’s preference for Webster’s Second as a “[p]rescriptive” dictionary that tells
readers “how they should use words.”94 Justice Scalia was responsible for a little under one-third of the citations of Webster’s
Second, and his fellow conservatives Justices Alito and Thomas
together contributed another one-third.95
Another choice that judges make is the publication date of the
dictionaries they decide to consult. We found that Justices were
three times as likely as appeals court judges to cite a dictionary
from the time of enactment, while circuit court judges were about
one and one-half times as likely as the Justices to cite a dictionary
from the time of filing.96 In part, this difference seems to reflect
the preference of certain Justices for the original meaning of statutory language.97 More generally, the quest for original word meaning
93. The distribution of citations across general dictionaries varied considerably among
circuits. The Seventh Circuit stood out in that 86 percent of its citations were to Webster’s 3rd
or to dictionaries in the “other” category.
94. Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 507. The differences between
prescriptive and descriptive dictionaries and their use in the Supreme Court are discussed in
id. at 507-09, 530-31.
95. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
96. Justices cited a dictionary from the time of enactment 48 percent of the time, compared with 16 percent for judges; Justices cited a dictionary from the time of filing 35 percent
of the time, compared with 56 percent for judges. Data for these calculations on file with the
authors.
97. A judge who seeks to ascertain the original meaning of a statutory word might choose
a dictionary published around the time of enactment; a judge who seeks to ascertain its
contemporary meaning might choose one published around the time the case was filed. For
a fuller discussion of the connection between publication data and interpretive approach, see
Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 511-12. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito cited at least one dictionary from the time of enactment 67 percent of the time, compared
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may be close to institutionally entrenched at the Supreme Court. By
contrast, appeals court judges may be drawn to a more practical
focus on which dictionary definitions were available to the parties
at the time of the dispute.98
Finally, on dictionary usage patterns in our prior work, we identified and discussed at some length a set of Supreme Court decisions
where the majority opinion deemed a dictionary definition to be virtually dispositive of statutory meaning and accordingly justified
expressly discounting or ignoring various larger contextual factors.99
This use of dictionaries as a barrier to consideration of congressional
intent or executive branch understanding has no counterpart in our
appeals court dataset.100 We discuss the implications of this finding
in Part III, but we note here the contrast with the Supreme Court’s
distinctive elevation of dictionary status in an important subset of
decisions spanning all three fields.101
2. Legislative History Usage Patterns
For opinions that cited legislative history, we focused on the various sources of legislative history. We divided those sources into nine
categories: House, Senate, and conference committee reports; House
and Senate floor statements; House and Senate hearings; vertical
with 39 percent for other Justices. But the differences between the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals remain substantial even when these three Justices are not included.
98. At an even more pragmatic level, perhaps appeals court judges and their law clerks
consult the dictionary closest to hand in chambers, which is likely to be a modern edition
rather than one published decades earlier. We are grateful to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl for suggesting this possibility.
99. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 540, 555-64 (discussing eight
such decisions from the early 1990s through 2012, four of which were decided by the Roberts
Court).
100. We found two majority opinions that could be viewed as barrier cases in that they
stopped their analysis after relying on a dictionary definition: a Tenth Circuit criminal law
decision, United States v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006), and a Seventh
Circuit labor decision, Cler v. Illinois Education Ass’n, 423 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2005). As
explained in Part III, these two cases are quite minor in import, and—unlike the Supreme
Court barrier decisions—the appeals court majority opinions do not expressly reject other
proffered interpretive resources that point in a different direction.
101. We analyzed one other question, the frequency with which dissenting opinions cited
dictionary definitions when majority opinions had done so. There was little difference between
the Supreme Court (39 percent) and the courts of appeals (37.5 percent). But there were only
eight dissents in the appeals court cases, so this comparison is not very meaningful. Data for
these calculations are on file with the authors.
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legislative history; and other. “Vertical” legislative history consists
of prior enacted or proposed versions of the statutory provision that
a court then compares with the current text being construed. These
prior versions appear either as “statutory history” in statutes from
a previous Congress or as “drafting history” in bills from the same
Congress containing the provision that a court is now interpreting.
“Other” is a miscellaneous category that appeared with some
frequency.102 We coded cases for each form of legislative history that
appeared in the majority opinion.
Table 6 shows the usage rates for a subset of the categories—
those that appeared frequently and for which there were meaningful
differences in usage rates between the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals or for which such differences might be anticipated.
The differences in use of vertical legislative history are striking: the
Supreme Court invokes this form of history more than three times
as often as the circuit courts. Also noteworthy are the differences in
use of House and Senate committee reports: the Supreme Court
used these two sources at similar rates while the courts of appeals
invoked Senate committee reports more than twice as often as
House reports.103
Table 6. Percentages of Majority Opinions Citing Selected Forms
of Legislative History
Form

Supreme Court

Courts of Appeals

Senate Committee Report
House Committee Report

52.5
45.0

58.8
26.9

Vertical History

32.5

9.3

102. This category includes legislative record documents such as transmittals from agencies, presidential messages to Congress, and reports of select committees.
103. As with dictionaries, we analyzed the frequency with which dissenting opinions used
legislative history when the majority opinion did so. That frequency was considerably higher
in the Supreme Court (50 percent) than in the courts of appeals (31 percent). But because of
the small numbers of appeals court dissents, the difference was not very meaningful. Data for
these calculations are on file with the authors.
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C. Supreme Court Versus Courts of Appeals: A Closer Look
1. Rates of Usage and Reliance
The most prominent difference between the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals in the sets of cases we analyzed is that majority opinions in the Supreme Court use both interpretive resources
at substantially higher rates than do court of appeals opinions. The
most obvious explanation for this difference is that statutory cases
heard by the Supreme Court are likely to involve more difficult
questions of interpretation than those that courts of appeals hear,
even in the unrepresentative sample of appeals court cases in which
their opinions are published. In turn, Justices have greater reason
to make use of interpretive resources of any type than do circuit
court judges.104
Undoubtedly, this distinction accounts for much of the gap between the two levels in the rates at which opinions cite and rely on
legislative history and dictionary definitions. But it does not provide
a full explanation. Even in the same cases, the Supreme Court is
still considerably more likely to cite dictionaries than are the courts
of appeals—about twice as likely in the 2005-2010 Terms of the
Court.105 And in the eighty cases in which the Supreme Court used
legislative history in the 2005-2014 Terms in our three fields, the
court of appeals opinions used it only a little more than one-third of
the time.106 Thus, there is a real difference in practices between the
two levels.
We found that both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
cited legislative history more than they cited dictionary definitions.
But, with the exception of the Tenth Circuit, the ratio of legislative
104. Cf. Bruhl, supra note 27, at 505-06 (finding that the rate of language canons usage in
Supreme Court cases is substantially higher than the rate in reported cases for courts of
appeals).
105. See Brudney & Baum, Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 9, at 112.
106. The rate was 37.5 percent. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. We would underline the fact that this does not mean the Supreme Court used legislative history three times
as often as did the courts of appeals in these cases because there undoubtedly were cases in
which the appeals court opinion used legislative history but the Supreme Court opinion did
not. In the 1986-2010 Terms, courts of appeals were more than six times as likely to cite
dictionaries in cases in which the Supreme Court did so than in other cases, but they also
cited dictionaries when the Court did not 5.2 percent of the time. See Brudney & Baum,
Dictionaries 2.0, supra note 9, at 110 tbl.1.
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history use to dictionary use was much higher in the courts of appeals than it was in the Supreme Court.107
The relatively high magnitude of the ratios for the Second and
Seventh Circuits seems unremarkable. For judges who accept legislative intent as a legitimate basis for statutory interpretation,
legislative history is an important element of legal analysis, along
with plain meaning, precedent, and agency deference. In contrast,
dictionaries are only one means to discern the plain meaning of
statutory language—along with canons and judicial common
sense108—and the Supreme Court scarcely invoked dictionaries at all
until recent times.109
From this perspective, the low ratios in the Supreme Court and
the Tenth Circuit are intriguing. For the Supreme Court, the low
ratio can be understood as a product of two developments: (1) the
strong opposition voiced by one Justice in particular to invoking
evidence of legislative intent—opposition that has reduced the
Court’s use of legislative history in statutory interpretation110—and
(2) a substantial growth in the Court’s collective interest in dictionary definitions.111 It is an open question whether the death of
Justice Scalia will alter the Court’s approach to legislative history
and result in more prevalent use, even if the reliance rate does not
return to levels experienced during the Burger Court era.112
Although the Tenth Circuit uses both resources much less frequently than the Supreme Court does, it may be that one or both of
the same forces have operated in that court as well. Possible
indicators of the Tenth Circuit’s special affinity for dictionaries are
107. Compare supra Table 1, with supra Table 3.
108. For examples of judicial “common sense” or introspective plain meaning analysis, see
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650-52 (2009); and Watson v. United States,
552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007); see also James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76
BROOK . L. REV. 901, 907 n.26 (2011) (citing cases).
109. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 494-95 (relying on data from
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ . L. REV. 77 (2010);
and Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999)).
110. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 161-62.
111. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, note 14, at 494-97.
112. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 30 (reporting Court reliance on legislative
history in over 45 percent of majority opinions for labor and employment decisions from 19691986).
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its exceptionally high use rate for labor and employment cases and
commercial cases, and its extraordinary reliance rate compared to
the two other circuits.113
2. Attributes of Usage
Beyond the overall rates at which the two levels of courts used
and relied on dictionary definitions, the most striking difference
between them in dictionary usage lies in the choice between general
and legal dictionaries. Supreme Court Justices were about twice as
likely to cite legal dictionaries in their majority opinions as were
court of appeals judges. But they were about eight times as likely to
cite general dictionaries.114
One source of this difference may lie in the fact that legal dictionaries, and particularly Black’s, draw their definitions primarily from
court decisions.115 Appeals court judges may find legal dictionaries
attractive as analogous to precedent. In contrast, Supreme Court
Justices may be less interested in such precedent—primarily drawn
from opinions of lower courts—and more interested in determining
the “ordinary meaning” of statutory language. From that perspective, dictionary usage in the Supreme Court may represent a
stronger inclination to treat dictionaries as an independent source
of information to use in determining the meaning of statutory language.116 Alternatively, Supreme Court usage of general dictionaries

113. For comparatively high usage rates in the two fields, see supra Table 1. The overall
reliance rates were 90 percent for the Tenth Circuit, compared with 61 percent in the Second
Circuit and 67 percent in the Seventh Circuit. Data for these calculations are on file with the
authors.
114. These ratios were determined by multiplying the overall rates of dictionary use in
supra Table 1 by the proportions of dictionary-citing opinions that used these two types of
dictionaries in the text accompanying supra notes 91-92.
115. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 509.
116. It might be, then, that as Supreme Court Justices became more inclined to cite dictionaries beginning in the 1980s, they departed from a traditional practice of focusing on legal
dictionaries—a practice that the courts of appeals have maintained. But in each decade from
the 1950s through the 1970s, Supreme Court opinions cited substantially more general dictionaries than legal dictionaries. This is true of the 1950s whether or not we include the
thirty-eight dictionaries that Justice Frankfurter cited in his opinion in Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson—nearly two-thirds of all dictionary citations in the 1950s. 343 U.S. 495 app. at 53340 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Our count was based on lists in Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 109, app. B, at 397-425.
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may reflect a penchant for cherry-picking supportive definitions
from among various options.117
In our first analysis of dictionary usage in the Supreme Court, we
identified several functions that dictionary reliance seems to serve
for the Justices.118 Among those functions are ensuring that ordinary citizens have adequate notice of what the criminal law prohibits119
and reinforcing textualism as a method of statutory interpretation.120 Although we cannot compare the functions of dictionary
citations in the two court levels in precise terms, two of our findings
offer hints of differences in approach between the Supreme Court
and the courts of appeals.
The first is our finding that, in the courts of appeals, dictionary
use and reliance are far more common in commercial cases than in
the other two fields in our study.121 No such pattern appeared in the
Supreme Court—indeed commercial use and reliance there involved
the lowest frequency among the three fields.122
The second finding is the prominence of decisions involving interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)123 among the labor and employment cases in which courts
of appeals cited dictionary definitions—eleven of seventeen. In
contrast, only two of the twenty-two Supreme Court opinions using
dictionaries in the labor and employment field were ERISA cases.
It is possible that ERISA cases constitute a higher proportion of the
labor and employment agenda in the courts of appeals than of the
Supreme Court’s agenda, but the difference could not be nearly
large enough to account for the intercourt disparity in dictionary use
in ERISA cases.124
Together, these two findings suggest that the trigger for dictionary usage in the courts of appeals may be more functional than it
is in the Supreme Court. As we explain in Part III, court of appeals
117. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 566-67.
118. See id. at 539-40.
119. Id. at 541-43.
120. Id. at 572-74.
121. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
122. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
124. The Supreme Court decided thirteen ERISA cases after oral argument in the 20052014 Terms, so the rate of dictionary use in those cases (15.4 percent) was distinctly lower
than in other labor and employment cases or statutory cases in general. See supra Table 1.
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judges often employ dictionaries in these complex civil contexts to
help resolve interpretive uncertainties in conjunction with a review
of purposive and pragmatic factors. This approach appears to be less
self-consciously textualist than the patterns of dictionary use we
have identified in the Supreme Court.125
With respect to legislative history, one difference that stands out
is that in cases using legislative history of any type, the Supreme
Court was far more likely to cite vertical legislative history than
were the courts of appeals: in 32 percent of the cases in which the
Supreme Court used legislative history, versus 9 percent in the
courts of appeals.126
Although vertical legislative history may be understood as one
means of ascertaining legislative intent, it also might be viewed as
an acceptable proxy for textualist interpretation by Justices who
discount or reject traditional legislative history commentary. In an
era when even legislative history proponents on the Supreme Court
have recently prefaced their discussion with qualifying or apologetic
lead-ins such as “for those who care about legislative history” or “for
those who find legislative history useful,”127 it is notable that the
Court’s vertical legislative history discussions do not include such
diminutive prefatory phrases.128
For our three fields, there were twenty-six majority opinions in
the Roberts Court that cited vertical legislative history.129 Nineteen
of these majorities referred to statutory history while seven invoked
drafting history.130 Ten of the eleven Justices who served for at least

125. See generally Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14.
126. See supra Table 6. Because the Supreme Court used some form of legislative history
at a little more than twice the rate of the courts of appeals, the proportion of all Supreme
Court opinions using vertical legislative history was about seven times as high as the
proportion in the courts of appeals. Although court of appeals opinions that used legislative
history cited a version of horizontal legislative history more often than the Supreme Court
(98.9 percent versus 86.3 percent), the small size of that difference means that the Supreme
Court still used horizontal legislative history at about twice the rate as the courts of appeals.
127. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (identifying nine such instances since
the 2010 Term).
128. See supra Part III.B for elaboration.
129. In addition, in the cases during this ten-Term period in which majority opinions cited
legislative history, there were ten other opinions (dissents or concurrences) in our three fields
that cited vertical history.
130. Of the twenty-six majorities, twelve were in criminal law, four in commercial law, and
ten in labor and employment law.
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a full term in the first decade of the Roberts Court, including legislative history skeptics Justices Scalia and Thomas, cited vertical
legislative history at least once in a majority opinion. There were no
strong patterns in the frequency with which Justices cited vertical
history, but it should be noted that textualist Justices Kennedy and
Alito were among the ones who did so most frequently.131
The second notable difference is in the use of Senate and House
committee reports. The Supreme Court cited the two in a comparable number of cases (42 and 36, respectively, out of 80 cases using
legislative history). In contrast, courts of appeals cited Senate committee reports more than twice as often as House reports (in 107
and 49 cases, respectively, out of 182 cases using legislative history).132 While our effort to account for these results is admittedly
speculative, one possibility is that differences in citation or reliance
are a function of the comparative briefing resources available to the
Justices and judges. In the Supreme Court, briefs (including amicus
briefs) typically set forth legislative history with ample nuance and
granularity, identifying in detail the order in which bills were taken
up between chambers, the alterations that occurred during progress
through each chamber, and the ways in which House-Senate
disagreements were resolved. This kind of in-depth briefing background—often not available in the courts of appeals—might well
encourage the Justices and their law clerks to draw on reports from
both chambers in roughly equal measure on a case-specific basis.133
131. All but Justice Kagan invoked vertical history in majority opinions; Justice Ginsburg
did so five times while Justices Alito and Kennedy invoked this resource on four occasions.
132. See supra Table 6. The dramatic tilt toward Senate reports is evident in all three
circuits, although strongest in the Seventh Circuit and weakest in the Tenth Circuit. The
proportions of majority opinions using legislative history that cited Senate reports were fairly
uniform across the circuits (ranging from 55 percent in the Second Circuit to 66 percent in the
Seventh Circuit). But the proportion citing House reports was considerably higher in the
Tenth Circuit (37 percent) than in the other circuits (24 percent in the Second Circuit and 22
percent in the Seventh Circuit). Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
133. See Bruhl, supra note 4, at 470-72. Another possibility is that circuit court
judges—especially if they are not regularly provided with the same rich briefing background
as the Justices receive—are more influenced by the traditional “textbook” understanding of
how Congress functions to enact laws. Senate action often requires a supermajority in order
to overcome real or threatened filibuster activity, and actual or threatened filibusters have
been an increasingly frequent occurrence in the past several decades. See BARBARA SINCLAIR,
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING : NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 136 tbl.6.1
(4th ed. 2012). Perhaps court of appeals judges inferred that Senate committee reports would
more closely reflect the contours and particulars of a bill’s final or enactable version; hence
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D. Comparing the Circuits
Because our primary interest is in comparing interpretive practices of the Supreme Court with the practices of the courts of appeals, we have focused thus far on that comparison. Differences
among the three circuits are also of interest, and here we turn to
those comparisons.
The use of dictionaries was not uniform across the three circuits.
The Second and Tenth Circuits were close to each other in citation
rates, at 10.8 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively. The citation
rate in the Seventh Circuit, 4.0 percent, is distinctly lower. The rate
of reliance on cited dictionary definitions was distinctly higher in
the Tenth Circuit than in the other two circuits.134 Thus, the proportion of opinions that cited and relied on dictionary definitions
was highest in the Tenth Circuit (0.108), lower in the Second Circuit
(0.065), and lowest in the Seventh Circuit (0.027). It was genuinely
rare for a Seventh Circuit majority opinion to rely on a dictionary
definition as even a partial basis for its decision. Along with their
higher reliance rate, Tenth Circuit opinions that cited dictionaries
were also much more likely to define multiple words with dictionaries than were opinions in the other two circuits.135
Variation across the three circuits in use of legislative history was
also substantial. The citation rates were 30.0 percent for the Second
Circuit, 18.6 percent for the Tenth Circuit, and 8.8 percent for the
Seventh Circuit. In cases in which opinions cited legislative history,
the rates of reliance on that history were similar across the circuits.136 The proportions of all majority opinions that relied on
they tended to rely more heavily on the explanatory value of those reports. Of course, in order
to begin to test this hypothesis or the one set forth in text, we would need to review at least
a sample of briefs to the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals—a project that is beyond
the scope of this Article.
134. That rate was 60.6 percent in the Second Circuit, 66.7 percent in the Seventh Circuit,
and 90.3 percent in the Tenth Circuit. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
135. That proportion was 48 percent for the Tenth Circuit, compared with 21 percent for
both the Second and Seventh Circuits. However, the Tenth Circuit did not stand out for the
mean number of dictionaries cited per word: the mean was 1.31 in the Second Circuit, 1.12
in the Seventh Circuit, and 1.26 in the Tenth Circuit. Data for these calculations are on file
with the authors.
136. Those rates were 79.1 percent for the Second Circuit, 74.0 percent for the Seventh
Circuit, and 78.3 percent for the Tenth Circuit. Data for these calculations are on file with the
authors.
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legislative history ranged from 23.7 percent in the Second Circuit to
6.5 percent in the Seventh Circuit.137 Once again, the Seventh Circuit stands out for its limited use of an interpretive resource. In
subject matter terms, the gap between Second Circuit legislative
history use and use by the other two circuits was especially wide in
criminal law cases.138 We explore this gap further in Part III.
The most important differences that we found were the low usage
rates of both resources by the Seventh Circuit, highlighted in Table
7. Those differences merit closer examination.
Table 7. Proportions of Majority Opinions Citing Dictionaries and
Legislative History, Three Circuits, 2005-2015
2d

7th

10th

30.0
28.2

8.8
7.6

18.6
14.4

45.2
21.6

22.0
7.3

47.3
21.9

10.8

4.0

11.9

9.9
16.5

4.0
7.6

10.0
27.0

8.2

2.9

12.5

Legislative History
All Cases
Criminal
Commercial
Labor and Employment
Dictionaries
All Cases
Criminal
Commercial
Labor and Employment

The data in Table 7 reinforce the impression that the Seventh
Circuit stands out from the other two circuits, in that the differences
between them span all three fields of law in the use of each resource.139
137. See supra Table 4.
138. The difference between the Second and Seventh Circuits was 3.71:1 on criminal law
cases, 2.05:1 on commercial cases, and 2.96:1 on labor and employment cases. The difference
between the Second and Tenth Circuits was 1.96:1 on criminal law cases, 0.96:1 on
commercial cases, and 0.99:1 on labor and employment cases.
139. There were also differences between the Seventh Circuit and the other two circuits
in the specific resources they used. Three of those differences were quite substantial: the
Seventh Circuit cited the Oxford English Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary
less than the other circuits, and it cited vertical legislative history less. The difference for
legislative history was considerable—a 2 percent citation rate, versus 12 percent for the other
two circuits. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
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One possible explanation derives from the fact that our analyses
were of officially reported decisions. The proportion of decisions that
are reported during this period is much higher in the Seventh
Circuit than in the other two circuits: the mean of the annual rates
of publication for fiscal years 2005-2014 was 13.0 percent in the
Second Circuit, 23.9 percent in the Tenth Circuit, and 41.6 percent
in the Seventh Circuit.140 Assuming that the distinctions made for
publication purposes are comparable in all three circuits,141 Seventh
Circuit judges, compared with their colleagues in the other two
circuits, are publishing more decisions in which the legal questions
are relatively simple and straightforward or the contested issues are
fact-specific and comparatively routine. Undoubtedly, judges are
less prone to invoke any kind of interpretive resource in these cases
than in cases with more complex and difficult issues.
Yet, differences in publication rates are unlikely to account for all
the differences in use of resources between the Seventh Circuit and
the other two circuits. Of the decisions that the Seventh Circuit
publishes but that the other two circuits would not publish, we are
reluctant to assume that the overwhelming majority of them are
unsuitable for any citations to interpretive resources such as
dictionary definitions and legislative history. Moreover, the low
publication rate in the Second Circuit very likely results in part
from the large numbers of immigration cases that its judges hear.142
140. These figures were calculated from data in the ADMIN . OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005-2013, at tbl.S-3 (2005-2013); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.B-12 (2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014]. The
Reports can be accessed online via http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/
judicial-business-united-states-courts.
141. In general, courts of appeals choose not to publish a decision when they determine
that it simply reiterates settled legal principles or is otherwise without precedential value.
See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR.
J. 475, 480 (2004). That said, there are differences among circuits both in the criteria and
methods they identify for determining publication and in the application of those criteria and
methods. See Thomas F. Kibbey, Standardizing the Rules Restricting Publication and Citation
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 63 OHIO ST . L.J. 833, 835 (2002); see also Erica S.
Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO .
L.J. 621, 642 (2009) (“One internal study conducted by the D.C. Circuit found that forty
percent of the Circuit’s unpublished decisions presented issues that warranted publication
according to the Circuit’s publication rules.”).
142. In the 2010-2014 fiscal years, 23.3 percent of the cases filed in the Second Circuit came
from the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, compared with 3.6 percent in the Seventh Circuit
and 3.4 percent in the Tenth Circuit. These figures were calculated from data in JUDICIAL
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With some caution, then, we can explore possible additional reasons for the low rate of usage of dictionary definitions and legislative
history in the Seventh Circuit. One place to start is the continuity
of the court’s membership. Of the nine active judges on the court in
2015, all but one had served throughout the preceding decade.143
Seven of the nine had been appointed in 1999 or earlier, and four
were Reagan appointees who joined the court between 1981 and
1987.144 The two judges who retired in the decade from 2005 to 2015,
and who continue to serve as senior judges, were also Reagan
appointees.145 That continuity of membership, in combination with
the court’s moderate size, creates conditions favorable to the development of an institutional perspective or culture within the
limitations that result from shifting panel membership.146 It is
possible that the court collectively has adopted a perspective that
makes judges more sparing in their use of legislative history and
dictionary definitions as interpretive resources.
Moreover, two of the court’s long-standing members, Judges
Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, are also among the most
prestigious of all court of appeals judges.147 Thus, their own practices are of particular interest as possible role models for circuit
court colleagues. In our sample of opinions using legislative history,
Easterbrook was about average in the number of opinions, and
Posner ranked second on the court.148 In contrast, they were the
BUSINESS 2014, supra note 140, at tbl.B-3, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics
_import_dir/B03Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WLS-98FL].
143. See United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 34. The exception was David Hamilton, who joined the court in 2009. See id.
144. See id. Richard Posner was appointed in 1981, Joel Flaum in 1983, Frank Easterbrook
in 1985, and Michael Kanne in 1987. See id.
145. See id. Kenneth Ripple was an active judge from 1985 to 2008, Daniel Manion from
1986 to 2007. See id.
146. Cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing much higher turnover rates on
Second and Tenth Circuits).
147. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 50 tbl.4 (2004) (ranking
Posner first and Easterbrook second for numbers of citations by judges in other circuits from
1998-2000); id. at 60 tbl.8 (ranking Posner first and Easterbrook second, far ahead of other
judges, for citations to them by name in opinions from 1998-2000).
148. Among the eight judges who were in active service throughout the 2005-2015 period,
the mean number of opinions citing legislative history in our sample of cases was about three.
Easterbrook cited legislative history in three opinions, Posner in six opinions (one coauthored
with Judge Hamilton). Cases are on file with the authors.
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least likely to cite dictionary definitions, each doing so only once in
our sample of cases.149 In Posner’s case, even that one citation was
not an actual use of a dictionary definition to define a word.150 Thus,
it may be that one or both of the Circuit’s most visible and respected
judges have helped to limit the use of dictionary definitions through
their own examples.
We delved deeper into these two judges’ dictionary usage rates
and found that, over the past thirty years, they used dictionaries
well under 1 percent of the time in nearly 1900 majority opinions
authored in reported cases across our three statutory fields.151 And
in terms of actual reliance, Posner and Easterbrook each relied on
a dictionary definition exactly once. Moreover, both judges have
been critical of dictionary use to construe statutory text in their academic writings,152 and each has shared that critical perspective in
one or more Seventh Circuit majority opinions.153 Accordingly, it
seems at least plausible to infer that part of the extraordinarily low
Seventh Circuit rate of dictionary usage reflects the influence of
these two prominent members of the circuit.
In addition to the low rates of resource usage in the Seventh
Circuit, some other differences among the circuits were sufficiently
149. See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (examining
the definition for the word “cause”); George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d
812, 816 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J.) (examining the definition for the word “inquiry”).
The mean for the other six judges who served throughout the ten-year period was about three.
Data for this calculation are on file with the authors.
150. See Hatfield, 591 F.3d at 948 (reporting that “Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
lists 26 terms in the entry for ‘cause’”).
151. Judge Posner cited a dictionary in seven cases out of 1004 majority opinions from 1985
to 2015 in our three statutory fields; Judge Easterbrook did so in four majorities out of 878
in the same time period. Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
152. See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 179-81 (2013); Easterbrook, supra
note 55, at 67.
153. See Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 757 F.3d 636, 643-44, 643 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) (Hamilton
& Posner, JJ.) (quoting skeptical views from Judge Easterbrook and Justice Jackson when
urging that “judges and lawyers must take care not to ‘overread’ what dictionaries tell us”);
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (emphasizing
that because “[d]ictionary definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of sentences
depends critically on context, including all sorts of background understandings,” these definitions are inadequate as “‘a means to decode the work of legislatures’” (quoting Easterbrook,
supra note 55, at 67)); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 876 F.2d 599, 600
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (characterizing dictionaries as “word museums,” of little
value for understanding words in context because “[s]peakers choose from a menu of meanings
or nudge the language toward a new one by striking out on their own”).
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large to merit attention. The Tenth Circuit, which ranked highest
in citation of dictionaries, stood out for its high rate of reliance on
dictionaries when it did cite them.154 The Tenth Circuit also was
distinctive for the frequency with which it used dictionaries and legislative history in commercial cases, compared with the other two
fields.155 This heavier use of both resources appears consistent with
an approach to interpretive ambiguities that combines textual and
purposive analyses.156 It also may be due in part to the more
complex nature of these business controversies, or to the greater
lawyering resources offered on both sides of such cases when compared to criminal and labor cases arising in the circuit.
Like the other two circuits, the Second Circuit used both resources most frequently in commercial cases.157 But the frequency
with which it cited legislative history in criminal cases is noteworthy: about twice as often as the Tenth Circuit, in contrast with the
similar rates at which the Second and Tenth Circuits used legislative history in the other two fields.158 We would expect legislative
history to be cited more often in white-collar cases than in other
statutory criminal settings, both because the statutory crimes tend
to have a more complex legislative background and because the
lawyers who represent white-collar defendants tend to have more
resources at their disposal to research and argue the merits of
possibly relevant legislative history.159 The Second Circuit has a
substantially higher rate of white-collar cases than the Seventh
Circuit and a much higher rate than the Tenth Circuit; this difference probably helps to account for the Second Circuit’s more
frequent usage of legislative history.160
154. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
155. See supra Table 7.
156. Cf. supra Part II.C.2 (discussing notable aspects of appeals court dictionary use in
commercial cases and ERISA decisions).
157. See supra Table 7.
158. See supra Table 7.
159. See generally Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 485, 487-89 (1999).
160. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 140, at tbl.B-7 (2014), http://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B07Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX6F-EE4C]. In
fiscal year 2014, charges of embezzlement, fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, and regulatory
offenses together constituted 26 percent of all criminal filings in the Second Circuit, compared
with 18 percent in the Seventh Circuit and 9 percent in the Tenth Circuit. Calculated from
data in id.; see also Robert J. Anello & Miriam L. Glaser, White Collar Crime, 85 FORDHAM
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The distinctive pattern of resource usage for the Seventh Circuit
and the subject matter variations for the Second and Tenth Circuits
are reminders that it is not just the Supreme Court that can stand
out from other courts in its collective approach to statutory interpretation. To be sure, other circuit court judges in our dataset, besides
Judges Posner and Easterbrook, may have taken individualized
approaches to our two interpretive resources, perhaps exhibiting
high rather than low regard for dictionaries, or even expressing
Scalia-like hostility to legislative history. By describing eclectic
differences in circuit-wide interpretive approaches, we do not dwell
on the possibility that each circuit culture may reflect a mix of
intense individual judicial preferences, analogous to the way that
the Supreme Court during this period reflected a mix of outspoken
textualists and purposivists.
The reason we do not dwell on this possibility is that we did not
find evidence to support it. We revisited opinions from the judges in
our three circuits who authored the highest number of majorities
using either dictionaries or legislative history.161 While there were
occasional instances of a judge emphasizing the presumptively preclusive primacy of ordinary-meaning textual analysis,162 we found
no examples of dictionaries being invoked to reject consideration of
legislative history or agency deference arguments offered by a losing
party or dissent (as in the Supreme Court’s barrier cases).163
L. REV. 39 (2016) (reviewing Second Circuit’s major contributions to the development of whitecollar criminal jurisprudence since the early twentieth century).
161. For dictionaries, we reviewed opinions from eleven judges who authored three or more
majorities that invoked dictionary definitions in our sample of cases (four judges from both
the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit, and three judges from the Seventh Circuit). For
legislative history, we reviewed opinions from thirteen judges who authored four or more
majorities that made use of that resource (five judges from the Second Circuit and four each
from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits). The only judges to appear on both lists were Judge
Katzmann (Second Circuit), Judge Williams (Seventh Circuit), and Judge Kelly (Tenth
Circuit).
162. For examples of majority opinions emphasizing ordinary-meaning textual analysis,
see, for instance, United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2010) (Livingston,
J.); and United States v. Montgomery, 468 F.3d 715, 719-20 (10th Cir. 2006) (Kelly, J.).
163. For discussion of Supreme Court barrier cases, see supra note 76 and accompanying
text and infra Part III.A.4. The two judges identified in supra note 162 have relied on
legislative history in addition to dictionary definitions as part of other majorities. See, e.g.,
United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2011) (Livingston, J.); Thomas v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2011) (Kelly, J.); see also Sabhnani, 599
F.3d at 256-57 (considering but rebutting as inapposite government’s reliance on deference
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Similarly, while circuit judges varied in the frequency with which
they used legislative history, we found no examples of majorities
that foreclosed resort to such history as illegitimate or superfluous.
We are persuaded that the circuit cultures we describe reflect reasonably consistent, albeit nonuniform, judicial practices, as opposed
to mosaics made up of dogmatic contributions from individual judges with sharply divergent interpretive approaches.
That said, we believe it is valuable to consider interpretive
approaches taken by other circuits as well. As a very preliminary
effort, we reviewed majority opinions from the same ten-year period
in our same three fields, authored by three prominent textualist
judges from other circuits: Judge Jay Bybee in the Ninth Circuit,
Judge William Pryor in the Eleventh Circuit, and Judge Jeffrey
Sutton in the Sixth Circuit.164 We found that Judges Bybee and
Pryor relied as much or more on legislative history as on dictionaries in our three fields.165 Judge Sutton relied on dictionaries substantially more often than on legislative history in the three fields,
but his treatment of legislative history was regularly nuanced and
respectful.166 In short, each of these three judges invoked the two resources as a means to decide particular cases rather than to express
interpretive philosophies.
We hope other scholars will be stimulated to examine statutory
interpretation in additional circuits, in ways comparable to our
analysis of these three appeals courts. Still, because of the Supreme
Court’s unique role, its differences with the courts of appeals are of
to agency’s interpretation of text).
164. Each judge was appointed by President George W. Bush, and each is affiliated with
the textualist camp. See DENIS RUTKUS ET AL., CONG . RESEARCH SERV., RL31868, U.S. CIRCUIT
AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH DURING THE 107TH -109TH
CONGRESSES, apps. 1-2 (2007).
165. Judge Bybee relied on legislative history in six majorities and on dictionaries in four;
Judge Pryor relied on legislative history in four majorities and on dictionaries in five. Copies
of all opinions are on file with the authors. See also Lawrence M. Solan, Response,
Opportunistic Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 225, 229-31 (2010) (discussing
Judge Bybee’s frequent use of legislative history in statutory opinions).
166. Judge Sutton relied on dictionaries in nine majorities and on legislative history in
three. For examples of opinions in which both resources received thoughtful analyses, see
Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332, 335, 339 (6th Cir. 2014 2014) (Sutton, J.)
(declining to rely on either resource); American Financial Group. v. United States, 678 F.3d
422, 424, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J.) (relying on both resources); and Barrett v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, 445 F.3d 874, 878, 880 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J.) (relying on both
resources).
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particular importance. In the next Part, we focus primarily on those
differences.
III. PRAGMATIC ADAPTABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS: A PROTEAN
APPROACH
A. Dictionary Use: Text, Purpose, Pragmatism
1. Commercial Law Examples
We noted earlier that while the Supreme Court uses dictionaries
substantially more than appeals courts, the differences between the
two judicial levels in dictionary use, and especially dictionary reliance, become much smaller in the commercial law field.167 We also
found that courts of appeals use and rely on dictionaries far more
frequently in commercial cases than in our two other fields, and that
in doing so these courts use general dictionaries more often, and use
two or more dictionaries per word considerably more often, than
they do in criminal or labor and employment cases.168
These findings invite further examination into how appeals court
judges may be applying dictionaries in distinctive ways in the
commercial law area. Does the more frequent use of dictionary definitions in commercial law controversies reflect resolution of
contested issues on a primarily textual basis in that field? Or is
dictionary use integrated with other interpretive considerations—
such as legislative purpose or pragmatic consequences—to develop
a more nuanced understanding of statutory meaning? A sample of
commercial law cases from all three circuits can shed light on these
questions.
In Vincent v. The Money Store, the issue was the scope of consumer protections under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).169 Defendant, a mortgage lender, had hired a law firm to
send allegedly deceptive letters on its behalf to plaintiff mortgagors.
Creditors are not generally considered debt collectors subject to the
FDCPA, but a creditor will be considered a debt collector (subject to

167. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
168. See text accompanying supra Table 5.
169. 736 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2013).
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liability under the statute) if “in the process of collecting his own
debts, [he] uses any name other than his own which would indicate
that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such
debts.”170
The Act does not define either “use” or “collect,” and Chief Judge
Katzmann for the Second Circuit panel majority looked to three
general meaning dictionaries for guidance.171 But he did so only after recognizing that the FDCPA is a remedial statute whose “terms
must be construed in liberal fashion if the underlying Congressional
purpose is to be effectuated.”172 Judge Katzmann applied the definition of “use” in this context to mean “employ for some purpose.”173
Liability for “use” under the false name exception thus required
some affirmative involvement in the misrepresentation by the
creditor (that is, not simply deceptive practices by the collection
actor).174 In this instance, that involvement took the form of retaining a law firm for the purpose of effectively impersonating The
Money Store by sending mortgage-breach letters that appeared to
be attorney collection letters.175
As for whether the law firm was deceptively “collecting or
attempting to collect” The Money Store’s debts, the Second Circuit
found the dictionary definition of “collect” in the context of debts to
be ambiguous because “[i]t does not define how involved a debt
collector must be before [the court] can fairly say it is gathering
money on behalf of the creditor.”176 Looking to the evidence below,
and to Federal Trade Commission guidance on an analogous statutory provision, the appeals court concluded that a jury could find
that the law firm was no more than a conduit for a debt collection
process controlled by the creditor.177 In deciding that a cause of
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
171. See Vincent, 736 F.3d at 98-99.
172. Id. at 98 (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d
1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)).
173. See id. at 99.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 100.
177. See id. at 101-02, 104. Accepting the facts as presented by plaintiffs for purposes of
reviewing a summary judgment grant below, the court found that the law firm printed and
mailed letters but did nothing else, directing subsequent phone calls from debtors to The
Money Store. See id. at 101. Thus, when the law firm’s letters represented that it had been
“retained” in order to “collect a debt for [its] client,” a jury could well find that this falsely
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action survived under the false name exception, the Second Circuit’s
reliance on dictionary definitions was leavened with an invocation
of statutory purpose and an appreciation for practical consequences.
In Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., the key issue was
whether anticompetitive conduct of defendant electronics companies
had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S.
domestic or import commerce under the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (FTAIA).178 The Second Circuit invoked two leading general dictionaries to identify alternative definitions of “direct”:
“[s]traight; undeviating in course; not circuitous or crooked” and
“[p]roceeding ... from cause to effect.”179 The court opted for the
second, less stringent notion of a direct effect, invoking both the
FTAIA’s purpose (the antitrust laws’ traditional reliance on proximate causation to determine what types of injuries are subject to
redress) and the untoward practical effects of adopting the “immediate consequence” definition (to make the FTAIA’s domestic effects
exception virtually identical to the FTAIA’s separate provision on
import exclusion).180 Once again, the Second Circuit’s reliance on
dictionary definitions was combined with consideration of purposive
and practical factors.181
There are similar instances in commercial law decisions from the
two other circuits we studied. The appeals courts in Gillespie v.
Equifax Information Services, L.L.C. and Thomas v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. both determined that reliance on dictionary definitions was influenced or constrained by invocation of statutory
purpose or pragmatic consequences.182
In Gillespie, the outcome hinged on the meaning of a credit
reporting agency’s duty to “clearly and accurately disclose ... [a]ll
information” in the plaintiffs’ consumer files under the Fair Credit
implied the firm was attempting to collect The Money Store’s debts. Id. at 104.
178. 753 F.3d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012)).
179. Id. at 410 n.6 (quoting from 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 702 (2d ed. 1989)
(alterations in original)); see also id. at 410 (quoting from parallel definition in WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1981)).
180. See id. at 411-12.
181. See also SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 570 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting general dictionary
definition of “meaningful” but declining to find error in district court’s refusal to instruct jury
on the definition of “meaningful work” because the term “meaningful” was “intelligible enough
to be understood by a lay jury for its plain definition”).
182. See Gillespie v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 484 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2007); Thomas
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2011).
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Reporting Act (FCRA).183 There is no statutory definition of “clearly
and accurately,” but Judge Kanne for the Seventh Circuit panel
consulted a general dictionary definition only after stating that
plain meaning should not be allowed to frustrate the overall purpose
of the statutory scheme.184 The court emphasized that a primary
purpose of the FCRA disclosure requirement is to enable consumers
to identify inaccurate information in their credit files and then
correct this information through a separate statutory grievance
procedure.185 In this context, the reporting agency’s current
disclosures—while accurate and set forth “in a clear manner”
consistent with one dictionary definition—provided information that
was unclear from a practical standpoint. Because this information
did not allow consumers to effectively review their credit files, it did
not meet applicable statutory requirements.186
In Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the issue was
whether a life insurance broker’s advice to plaintiffs regarding
allocation of their funds under a 401(k) account was actionable
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (IAA) or instead was
exempt from liability because the advice was given “solely incidental
to” his conduct as a broker-dealer who “receives no special compensation” for the advice.187 Judge Kelly for the Tenth Circuit panel,
noting that the IAA does not define “solely incidental to,” relied on
general and legal dictionary definitions of “incidental” as meaning
both secondary in importance and connected to the primary
activity.188 He emphasized the relational dimension, concluding that
“solely incidental to” means “solely in connection with,” as opposed
to “solely a minor part of.”189 Judge Kelly then invoked the SEC’s
183. See Gillespie, 484 F.3d at 940-41 (second alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g(a)(1)).
184. See id. at 941.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 941-42; see also Acosta v. Target Corp., 745 F.3d 853, 859-60 (7th Cir. 2014)
(holding that retailer sending holders of store credit cards unsolicited upgraded store cards
while deactivating the old cards was a “substitution” not covered under the Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)). The Seventh Circuit determined that the new cards merely changed
an existing account rather than opening a new account, and in doing so the court invoked the
practical measures Target took and also the expansive definition of “account” under Black’s
Law Dictionary. Id.
187. 631 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006)).
188. See id. at 1162 & n.2.
189. See id. at 1161-62.
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consistent guidance and the IAA legislative history to confirm that
the IAA’s purpose and its agency application did not reach brokerdealers whose advisory services were in connection with the
brokerage services they provided to the same account.190
The decisions summarized above reflect certain distinctive
aspects of our findings on dictionary usage in appeals court commercial law decisions—notably the more frequent use of two or more
dictionaries, and of general, as opposed to legal, dictionaries, than
is true for the criminal and labor and employment fields.191 It is
possible that the overall heavier dictionary use in commercial law
cases is due to the greater complexity of the subject matter.
Compared to criminal law, there are notably fewer routine appeals
in commercial law cases. Compared to both criminal and labor law,
there is more often highly resourced lawyering on each side.192 The
greater focus on dictionaries may also be due in part to a more
frequent and rapid rate of congressional overrides for these types of
cases, as discussed in Part I.193 Insofar as circuit judges are aware
of heightened congressional concern in the business law field, they
may invoke dictionaries more often as a putatively objective or neutral source for construing ambiguous text.194
What also emerges from the decisions discussed above is a fairly
nuanced reliance on dictionaries. When invoking dictionary definitions to help clarify textual ambiguity, judges in all three circuits
integrate that reliance with serious consideration of the statutory
purpose behind the ambiguous text and the practical consequences
that flow from applying a specific definition. As we suggest below,

190. See id. at 1162-64 (relying on SEC opinions and rules from 1940s forward and on IAA
legislative history indicating that brokers and dealers, who were already regulated by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, were not the target of the IAA); see also FTC v. Accusearch
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197-99 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying general dictionary definitions,
tempered by clear statutory purpose, to hold that website operator was in part “responsible”
for “development” of information provided through the Internet and was therefore a covered
information content provider under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230).
191. This Section discusses seven commercial law examples out of the twenty dictionary
usage cases in our commercial law field. We do not suggest that they are perfectly representative in all respects.
192. See supra note 58.
193. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
194. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 499-501.
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this adaptable application of definitions differs in certain respects
from the recent Supreme Court record on dictionary usage.195
2. ERISA Examples
We noted in Part II.C that within the labor and employment field,
more than half the appeals court decisions invoking dictionaries
involved disputes arising under ERISA.196 As with commercial law
decisions, court of appeals dictionary usage in ERISA cases incorporates purposive and pragmatic considerations accompanying
application of this complex statute.
In George v. Junior Achievement of Central Indiana, the Seventh
Circuit panel had to decide whether an employee terminated after
he complained about his employer’s failure to fund his retirement
and health savings accounts could be protected under ERISA’s
antiretaliation provision.197 The relevant statutory language prohibits retaliation because a person “has given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating
to this ... Act.”198 Writing for the panel, Judge Easterbrook characterized this provision as “a mess of unpunctuated conjunctions and
prepositions,” but he invoked purposive implications to add that
when construing an ambiguous antiretaliation provision, “we are
supposed to resolve the ambiguity in favor of protecting employees.”199
Judge Easterbrook then focused on the nub of the parties’ textual
disagreement: whether an “inquiry” means something formal or
official (such as a Labor Department investigation) or could also
mean something informal like simply raising a question.200 Emphasizing the importance of not “discarding definitions that would make
sense in the statutory context,”201 Easterbrook chose the general
195. See infra Part III.C.
196. By contrast, less than 10 percent of Supreme Court dictionary usage cases in the labor
field implicated the interpretation of this statute. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
197. 694 F.3d 812, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2012).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012).
199. George, 694 F.3d at 814.
200. See id. at 814-15. It was not disputed that plaintiff had “given information” to
company executives regarding the lack of funding of his retirement and health savings
accounts. See id. at 813.
201. Id. at 815.
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dictionary definition of “inquiry” that embraced informal usage.202
In doing so, he again emphasized the purpose of this antiretaliation
provision, borrowing as well from broad Supreme Court applications
of similar (though differently worded) provisions in other federal
workplace statutes.203
In Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum
Co. and Rasenack ex rel. Tribolet v. AIG Life Insurance Co., two
Tenth Circuit panels considered appeals from the denial of disability
plan benefits based on the plan administrators’ interpretation of
particular plan terms.204 In both cases, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the practical significance of using a definition that captures
ordinary meaning as it would be understood by a reasonable plan
participant.205
In Flinders, the issue was whether the availability of benefits
“arranged by the Company for its employees generally” extended
benefits to a group of unionized employees. The court invoked a
general dictionary definition to conclude that “generally” here
meant not “universally” but “for the most part”; thus the existence
of certain specific exclusions from plan coverage did not taint the
availability for employees generally in this setting.206 In Rasenack,
the plaintiff was denied benefits because the plan interpreted
“paralysis” (a qualifying condition for benefits) to mean the total
absence of movement, and the effects of plaintiff’s accident was to
leave him with substantial but not total loss of motor function and
sensation in his arm and leg. The court relied on medical dictionary
202. See id. at 816 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1010 (2d ed. 1989)). This is the
only time we have found Judge Easterbrook to rely on a dictionary definition in nearly 900
majority opinions in the criminal law, commercial law, and labor and emplyment law fields.
See supra Part II.D.
203. George, 694 F.3d at 814-15 (relying on analysis from Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011), that interpreted antiretaliation language of
FLSA and Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009), that
interpreted antiretaliation language of Title VII).
204. See Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum Co., 491 F.3d 1180,
1184 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Spadley v. Owens-Ill. Hourly Emps.
Welfare Benefit Plan, 686 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2012); Rasenack ex rel. Tribolet v. AIG Life
Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 1311, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009).
205. See Flinders, 491 F.3d at 1194; Rasenack, 585 F.3d at 1318; see also Paese v. Hartford
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 435, 450-51 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that “culpability” is
distinct from “bad faith” when determining award of attorney’s fees under ERISA statutory
language, relying on legal dictionary definition).
206. See Flinders, 491 F.3d at 1195-96.
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definitions to conclude that there was more than one reasonable
meaning of “paralysis” and that the plan’s term should be strictly
construed against AIG as its drafter.207
As with commercial law cases, the ERISA decisions reflect dictionary use adjusted or tempered in light of both legislative purpose
and practical consequences.208 This integrated use of dictionary
definitions is a fairly straightforward idea, but its express aspects
stand in some contrast to what we identified as a more strictly
linguistic or textualist strand of dictionary reliance in the Supreme
Court.209 One further interesting aspect of the ERISA dictionary
cases in the courts of appeals is how often the majority defined
terms not contained in the statute itself—generally either a medical
condition or some other qualifying arrangement that a plan
administrator had construed differently from the plaintiff participants.210 In a long and complex statute like ERISA, one that borrows
concepts from the common law of trusts and also implicates a range
of health and disability issues, it is perhaps not surprising that
disputes often focus in part on the meaning of terms beyond the
statutory text. This will occur in the Supreme Court as well, but
given that the Court almost always decides to review statutory cases
based on circuit court interpretations of the meaning of textual
provisions, Supreme Court ERISA cases involving dictionaries may
hew closer to the terms of the statute itself.
3. Criminal Law Examples of De Minimis or Minor Use
In contrast to the commercial law and ERISA fields, we found a
higher proportion of de minimis dictionary usage by the circuit
courts in criminal law majority opinions, where the cases tend to be
more straightforward and even routine. The frequent citation of
dictionaries for purely background purposes distinguishes this
appeals court approach from the Supreme Court’s more sophisti207. See Rasenack, 585 F.3d at 1319-20.
208. This Section discusses four of the eleven ERISA cases using dictionaries.
209. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 555-64.
210. Three of the four ERISA cases discussed above, and eight of the eleven in our dataset,
fall into this category. Of the two Supreme Court ERISA majority opinions using dictionary
definitions, one seeks guidance in defining a statutory term and the other involves defining
a concept (conflict of interest) closely related to a statutory term (fiduciary). Cases are on file
with the authors.
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cated reliance on dictionaries in criminal cases, where definition
and ordinary meaning analysis often serve a “notice” function for
criminal defendants, and by extension, the citizenry at large211 in
cases that are more than routine. One finding that arguably supports this distinction is the level of dictionary reliance in the
criminal law field. When the Supreme Court cited a dictionary definition in a criminal law majority opinion, it relied on that definition
94 percent of the time; in the courts of appeals, the reliance rate was
much lower, at 71 percent.212 This was the only field in which the
Supreme Court had a substantially higher reliance rate than the
courts of appeals.213
Once again, a sample of appeals court cases is illustrative. There
are numerous decisions from all three circuits where the dictionary
definition is cited for de minimis reasons, with no reliance at all.214
Many other cases involve a minor element of reliance where dictionary definitions are invoked in a distinctly peripheral or secondary
fashion.215 To be sure, the courts of appeals also rely on dictionaries
in a more meaningful way to help resolve an interpretive issue.216
211. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 541-43 and cases cited
therein.
212. See supra Part II.A.1 (paragraph preceding supra Table 2).
213. See supra Part II.A.1 (paragraph preceding supra Table 2).
214. See, e.g., Akinsade v. Holder, 678 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2012) (using Black’s to define
“embezzlement”); In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 954 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008) (using Oxford English
Dictionary to define the religious cult “Santeria”); United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 160
(2d Cir. 2008) (using Black’s to define “ejusdem generis”); United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d
719, 725 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (using a medical dictionary definition of “replantation”); United
States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219, 1244 (10th Cir. 2014) (using Black’s definitions of “substantive evidence” and “impeachment evidence”); see also United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945,
948-49 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (citing Black’s definition of “primary cause” as a straw man,
dismissing any value for the dictionary approach).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (invoking Black’s
with respect to “transportation” of a minor with intent to commit criminal sexual activity;
issue on appeal involved jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the United States);
United States v. Gordon, 642 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (invoking Black’s with
respect to “robbery” offense as including a taking by force or intimidation; appeal failed on
obvious fact that defendant used intimidation in getting bank teller to hand over the money);
United States v. Hernandez, 568 F.3d 827, 830 (10th Cir. 2009) (invoking Black’s definition
of “physical force” to support that firing a gun in the direction of another person constitutes
a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminals Act).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 645 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2011) (invoking Black’s
to help support lower court decision that a stolen firearm “designed” to shoot automatically
warrants enhanced prison sentence); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 418 (7th Cir.
2010) (invoking general dictionary to support conclusion that state law conviction for
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Such reliance appears to be more frequent in Tenth Circuit decisions, which is not surprising given that this circuit’s rate of
reliance on cited definitions in criminal law cases is far above both
the Second and Seventh Circuits.217 Still, even in the Tenth Circuit,
the cases of reliance do not seem to perform anything like the
“notice” function we identified in certain Supreme Court decisions.
Instead, these instances of meaningful reliance invoke definitions
as a valuable factor in reviewing a conviction or sentence, but a
factor that is neither effectively dispositive for the parties nor
especially instructive for a broader audience of defendants or
citizens.218
4. Small Number and Limited Import of Barrier Cases
In our previous work, we identified eight Supreme Court decisions since the 1990s in which the majority opinion invoked
dictionary definitions not in conjunction with traditional interpretive resources such as legislative history, statutory purpose, or
agency deference, but rather to foreclose in explicit terms any serious
consideration of such contextual resources.219 Of these decisions,
four were issued during the Roberts Court, out of the sixty-five cases
in which the majority cited a dictionary.220 Each majority opinion
aggravated “fleeing” contains an implied requirement of intentional conduct for sentencing
purposes within the meaning of Armed Career Criminal Act).
217. See supra Table 2. The Tenth Circuit relied on cited dictionary definitions in 94.7
percent of the criminal law majority opinions that refer to dictionaries. By contrast, the
reliance rate was 58.8 percent for the Second Circuit and 53.3 percent for the Seventh Circuit.
Data for these calculations are on file with the authors.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Cope, 676 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2012) (invoking Black’s
to help affirm conviction); United States v. Rendon-Alamo, 621 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.
2010) (invoking general dictionary to help affirm sentence); United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d
674, 677 (10th Cir. 2008) (invoking Black’s to help reverse conviction).
219. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 555-64.
220. Those four cases were Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156,
2170-71 (2012) (Alito, J.); Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002-04
(2012) (Alito, J.); Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011)
(Thomas, J.); and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175-76 (2009) (Thomas,
J.). The four others we identified as barrier cases are Allentown Mack Sales & Services, Inc.
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998) (Scalia, J.); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76
(1995) (Kennedy, J.); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (Scalia, J.); and Smith
v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229, 237-38 (1993) (O’Connor, J.). See Brudney & Baum, Oasis
or Mirage, supra note 14, at 555-64, 564 n.332.
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emphasized that the clarity of the text—established to a considerable extent by dictionary definitions—rendered further interpretive
analysis unnecessary and indeed improper.221 We referred to these
decisions as “barrier” cases, in that the Court, despite strong objections from dissenters, invoked dictionary definitions as essentially
dispositive in conjunction with related ordinary meaning arguments—thus precluding inquiry into or reliance on contextual
resources derived from Congress (legislative history and purpose) or
the Executive (agency guidance).222
In our dataset of eighty-eight appeals court majority opinions
invoking dictionary definitions, we found two instances we could
describe as barrier-type uses: decisions that ceased interpretive
analysis because the ordinary meaning—established through or
buttressed by dictionary definitions—was conclusively clear.223
However, unlike the Supreme Court cases discussed above, neither
appeals court decision involved a dissent, and neither addressed or
expressly rejected other proffered interpretive resources that might
point in a different direction. Moreover, the two cases are of distinctly minor importance. In Cler v. Illinois Education Ass’n, the
Seventh Circuit invoked Black’s to support its plain meaning determination that the phrase “prepaid legal services” in the ERISA
definition of “employee welfare plan” included legal services on
employment-related matters, not simply personal legal services.224
In reversing a district court dismissal of plaintiff’s claim, the court
of appeals remanded without deciding if the welfare plan in
question is actually covered under ERISA.225 In United States v.
Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit invoked a general meaning dictionary
to support affirming a lower court conviction by concluding that
“removal” of the contents of U.S. mail did not require a jury
221. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170 (5-4 decision, rejecting longstanding agency
regulations and guidelines); Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2002-04, 2006 (6-3 decision, disregarding
legislative history and also district court practice pointing in opposite direction); Janus
Capital Grp., 564 U.S. at 141-48 (5-4 decision, disregarding contrary arguments based on
agency’s consistent interpretation of text in prior adjudications and briefs); Gross, 557 U.S.
at 175-77 (5-4 decision, disregarding contrary indications based on Congress’s evident intent
and Court’s own well-settled precedent).
222. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 483-84, 555-64.
223. See United States v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir. 2006); Cler v. Ill. Educ.
Ass’n, 423 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2005).
224. See Cler, 423 F.3d at 731.
225. See id. at 730-32.
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instruction of intent to convert the removed contents to one’s
personal use.226
In sum, we have not found the same judicial support for considering dictionaries as barriers to further interpretive inquiry as has
been evidenced by a persistent group of textualist-oriented Supreme
Court Justices. Admittedly, these barrier cases are relatively rare
even at the Supreme Court level, and we do not view the difference
from appeals court occurrences as substantial in quantitative
terms.227 At the same time, the Supreme Court dictionary barrier
cases are part of a larger set of barrier decisions in which a majority’s strict textualist analysis—relying on ordinary meaning and
language canons as well as dictionaries—has precluded consideration of interpretive resources associated with the politically
accountable branches, notably legislative history and agency interpretation.228 By contrast, the absence of any indication that circuit
courts engage in dictionary barrier analysis of this kind is consistent
with the commercial and ERISA case law examples discussed above,
in which dictionary usage is integrated with serious attention to
legislative purpose and practical consequences.229 In this respect,
the barrier cases—though limited in number—suggest a qualitative
difference between the two judicial levels regarding how textual
analysis is marshaled or imposed.

226. See 456 F.3d at 1182.
227. That said, the difference between 4 of 65 barrier cases in the Supreme Court (6.2
percent) and none at all in our court of appeals sample of 88 dictionary-using decisions is
noteworthy.
228. In the labor and employment area, see, for example, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768, 2772 (2014) (5-4 decision); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581-83
(2009) (5-4 decision); and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258-59, 259 n.6 (2009) (54 decision). For similar textualist barrier decisions in the labor and employment field during
the Rehnquist Court, see, for example, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 11416, 119 (2001) (5-4 decision); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1999) (7-2
decision); and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 255-59 (1993) (5-4 decision).
229. See supra Parts III.A.1-2.

2017]

PROTEAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

743

B. Legislative History: Strategic and Functional Approaches
1. The Supreme Court’s Strategic Perspective on Legislative
History
We noted in Table 6 that in opinions that cite legislative history,
Supreme Court Justices use vertical history more than three times
as often as appeals court judges do. In contrast, circuit court judges
invoke traditional legislative history commentary (committee
reports, floor debates, et cetera) on more than nine out of every ten
occasions when they cite to legislative history, compared with less
than 70 percent for the Supreme Court. The explanation for this
stark difference lies with the distinctively polarized nature of the
legislative history debate in the Supreme Court—a debate stimulated over several decades by Justice Scalia.
From the time he joined the Court, Justice Scalia authored dozens of separate opinions expressly attacking or questioning the
majority’s reliance on legislative history, including numerous
concurrences where he declined to join all or part of the majority
opinion.230 These extended critiques are associated with diminished
use of legislative history in the Supreme Court, dating especially
from the Rehnquist Court era.231 As part of the overall decline in the
Court’s legislative history use, liberal Justices at times refrained
from using legislative history in majority opinions, seemingly in
order to help secure Justice Scalia’s support.232
More recently, liberal Justices who endorse legislative history as
an interpretive resource have been inserting diminutive or quasiapologetic phrases as a preface to their reliance on committee
reports, floor debates, and hearing records. We noted nine instances
in our three fields since the start of the 2010 Term in which opinion
230. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 161-62 (citing and discussing more than
twenty concurrences authored between 1987 and 2006).
231. See generally Koby, supra note 2, at 390-95; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The
Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222-24 (2006).
232. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 163-67 (reporting that in labor and
employment decisions between 1987 and 2002, Justices White, Stevens, and Breyer—all
outspoken advocates of reliance on legislative history—did not cite to it at all in a dozen proemployer majority opinions joined by Justice Scalia, even though the prevailing litigants
relied seriously on legislative history evidence in their briefs).
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authors made prefatory remarks such as “For those who take legislative history into account,”233 “For those of us for whom [legislative history] is relevant,”234 or “[F]or those who accept [legislative
history].”235 All such remarks are authored by liberal Justices.236
Justice Scalia joined most of these opinions and never criticized
their qualified reliance on legislative history. On the two occasions
of such majority-qualified use when Justice Scalia was on the
dissenting side, he also did not address the majority’s reliance on
legislative history.237 The Justices have invoked this form of diminutive preface in other substantive areas as well, to similar effect.238
One might explain these recent developments in both collegial
and strategic terms. Given Justice Scalia’s well-documented hostility to committee reports and floor debates, the liberal Justices
apparently decided to accommodate a colleague, and avoid his
sharply critical concurring remarks, while not abandoning their
interest in relying on such legislative record materials for confirmatory purposes. This approach also enabled them to retain Justice
Scalia’s unreserved support, which was perhaps a special advantage
in efforts to preserve unanimity or to anchor a fifth vote for majority
status.239

233. Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 24 n.7 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.).
234. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 500 n.13 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.).
235. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010) (Breyer, J.).
236. Justice Breyer has used a version of this diminutive preface in three majority opinions
besides Hertz Corp.: FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1361, 1369 (2013); and United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S.
647, 659 (2011). Justice Sotomayor used such prefatory remarks in one majority opinion
besides Pepper: United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014). And Justice Kagan
has invoked similar prefatory wording in two opinions joined by Justice Scalia: Tapia v.
United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (majority) (“Finally, for those who consider legislative
history useful”); and Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1093 (2015) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“And legislative history, for those who care about it”).
237. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at
1373-80, 1383-86, 1388-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561 (2013) (Alito, J.) (7-2
decision construing Indian Child Welfare Act provision; Justice Scalia dissenting without
reference to legislative history); Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1888 n.3 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J.) (5-4 decision construing bankruptcy code provision; Justice Scalia joining the
majority).
239. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 24 (2010) (Scalia joining unanimous
opinion); Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 95 (same); Pepper, 562 U.S. at 500 (Scalia joining as fifth
member of 5-4 majority); Hall, 132 S. Ct. at 1888 n.3 (same).
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At the same time, the decision by a number of Justices to imply
that legislative history is of limited interest and qualified importance to the Court conveys a sense of second-class status in the
pantheon of interpretive resources. Such judicial conduct may seem
puzzling given that ten of the eleven Justices who have served on
the Roberts Court for at least one full term have relied on legislative
record evidence in the three fields we analyzed at various points. It
may even be regarded as disturbing, in light of recent scholarly
demonstrations of how highly this evidence is credited and respected by members of Congress and their staffs as part of the
lawmaking process.240
However one evaluates the liberal Justices’ recent characterizations of legislative history, we found no evidence of such diminutive
or qualifying language in court of appeals majorities. Rather, their
approach typically involves a neutral or unqualifiedly supportive
use of, or reliance on, legislative history. Thus, majority opinions in
all three circuits and all fields regularly invoke committee reports
or floor debates as a means of resolving textual ambiguities;241 of
demonstrating that the text is not devoid of ambiguity (justifying
resort to agency deference);242 of confirming the apparent meaning
of the text;243 or simply of explicating Congress’s specific intent with
no prefatory phrase at all.244 Although there are doubtless some
240. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN . L. REV. 901, 965-70 (2013); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of
Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 606-09 (2002).
241. See, e.g., Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 328 (2d Cir. 2012); Suesz v. Med-1 Sols., LLC,
757 F.3d 636, 643-45 (7th Cir. 2014); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840, 846-47
(7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 560 U.S. 674 (2010); James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312,
1317 (10th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727
F.3d 1246, 1262-64 (10th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2818 (2014); see also, e.g., Kerber v.
Qwest Pension Plan, 572 F.3d 1135, 1145-47 (10th Cir. 2009) (regarding clear legislative
history as trumping an agency definitional guideline).
242. See, e.g., Hackworth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 468 F.3d 722, 728-29 (10th Cir.
2006); Toomer v. City Cab, 443 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2006).
243. See, e.g., SEC v. Rosenthal, 650 F.3d 156, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 169 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Singh v. City of New York, 524
F.3d 361, 369 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 335 (2d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport,
Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers
Int’l Union, 734 F.3d 708, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2013); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. SUD’s of Peoria,
Inc., 474 F.3d 966, 975-76 (7th Cir. 2007).
244. See, e.g., In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2006); Coan
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appeals court judges who use legislative history more than others,245
we did not see anything resembling methodological reservations or
debates about legislative history’s inherent value of the kind that
have regularly surfaced in Supreme Court opinions.
The obvious question is whether such legislative history debates
will continue among the Justices following Justice Scalia’s death. In
that regard, it will be interesting to see whether the liberal Justices
cease using qualifying or diminutive prefatory phrases when relying
on legislative history. Initial indications are that such phrases may
cease to be part of the framing of discussions or disagreements
about the applicability and value of such history.246
Intriguingly, the Supreme Court’s frequent use of vertical legislative history is not accompanied by the types of diminutive prefaces
discussed above. When the majority invoked simply earlier “bill”
versions of the ultimately enacted text,247 or previously enacted versions of the text that have since been adjusted,248 no effort was made
to qualify or diminish the nature of the evidence being used.249 This
silence suggests that the concerns voiced by Justice Scalia, and
shared at certain times by other Justices endorsing primarily
textualist analyses, are focused on narrative commentary rather
v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 259-61 (2d Cir. 2006); Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc.,
673 F.3d 609, 620-22 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683-84, 686 (7th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2009); Johnson
v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 2006).
245. Given our sampling approach and the number of sitting judges on our three circuits,
we did not attempt to code for proportionate use by individual judges.
246. See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 967-68, 973-75 (2016) (Justice
Sotomayor for the majority and Justice Kagan for the dissent vigorously debate the probative
significance of committee report materials).
247. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 318-20 (2009) (Souter, J.); United
States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 428-29 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 579-81 (2006) (Stevens, J.). This is often referred to as “drafting history.”
248. See, e.g., United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395, 1401 (2014) (Kennedy,
J.); FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1452 (2012) (Alito, J.); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United
States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 412-13 (2011) (Thomas, J.); Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 401-05 (2010) (Ginsburg, J.); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 904-05 (2007) (Kennedy, J.); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 200-01
(2007) (Alito, J.). This is sometimes referred to as “statutory history.”
249. Of the 26 cases where the majority makes use of vertical history (12 criminal, 4 commercial, 10 labor), the majority invokes a qualifying preface on 3 occasions; each opinion also
relies on committee reports, floor debates, and/or hearing testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014); Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 29 n.7 (2010);
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 86-88, 95 (2010).
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than textual iterations, even iterations by the same subgroups that
produce the commentary.
Admittedly, there are certain differences between statutory history, which has already been enacted by prior Congresses, and
drafting history, which has not been enacted and according to some
textualist critiques can be manipulated in the way reports and floor
statements allegedly are.250 But even the earlier bill versions that
comprise drafting history are “text,” organically linked to the final
enacted version of text and in that regard quite different from
narrative commentaries. In six of the seven instances of drafting
history usage by the majority in our three fields, Justice Scalia is
silent as to its use251—this during a period when he continues to
criticize sharply the Court’s invocation of traditional legislative
history.252
Perhaps as a consequence, the Justices have made greater use of
this “more textual” form of legislative history, recognizing that its
use does not require disclaimers and will not stimulate sharp criticisms. By contrast, as court of appeals judges do not inject methodological critiques of legislative history into their opinions, or object
in principle to any particular forms of that history, these judges
seem to approach the use of legislative history generally on more
functional and less strategic grounds. Accordingly, their use of
250. On one occasion, Justice Scalia in dissent sharply criticized the majority’s use of drafting history on grounds similar to his general indictment of legislative history. See Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 667-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On a second occasion, he concurred in part, refusing
to join the section of the majority opinion addressing statutory history. See United States v.
Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 277 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). However, on numerous occasions
Justice Scalia joined majority and dissenting opinions that invoked vertical history, with no
disclaimers. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 247-48.
251. See, e.g., Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1415-16 (Scalia, J., authoring separate concurrence);
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 340-41 (2010) (Scalia, J., joining unanimous
decision); Corley, 556 U.S. at 329-30 (Scalia, J., joining dissent, which also invokes drafting
history); Hayes, 555 U.S. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., joining dissent).
252. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 458-59 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); Zedner v. United
States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). On several other occasions, Justice
Scalia joined majority opinions that invoked vertical history with no disclaimers. See, e.g.,
Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (2015)
(statutory history); Schindler Elevator Corp. 563 U.S. at 412-13 (statutory history);
Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 822 (2009) (statutory history). Justice Scalia also
made use of vertical history himself—in a majority opinion, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134
S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (statutory history), and a dissent, Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2321, 2343 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (drafting history).
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vertical history is not disproportionate, as they also invoke committee reports or floor statements, unaffected by considerations of
collegiality or risk-avoidance.
2. Second Circuit Reliance in Criminal Law Cases
We reported in Table 7 that, among the courts of appeals, the
Second Circuit’s legislative history use is especially heavy in the
criminal law field—twice as frequent as the Tenth Circuit (versus
roughly equivalent in the two other subject matter fields) and four
times as frequent as the Seventh Circuit (compared to two to three
times more frequent in the two other fields). One factor that we
believe helps to explain this difference is the relatively high number
of white-collar criminal cases in the Second Circuit.253 As noted
earlier, there are at least two possible reasons why legislative
history might be used more often when construing statutes creating
white-collar crimes. One is that white-collar defendants receive
higher quality legal representation, and their briefs may therefore
provide a more complete or challenging presentation of legislative
record evidence.254 The other is that at least some of the white-collar
statutes under which defendants were charged are more complex in
structure and history than other federal criminal statutes involving
violence or substance abuse.255 Accordingly, there may be a more developed or focused legislative history to examine and invoke. Several
examples illustrate the ways that the Second Circuit has utilized
such history in white-collar criminal cases.
In United States v. Aleynikov, the defendant appealed his
conviction for stealing and transferring computer source code for the
Goldman Sachs high frequency trading (HFT) system, in violation
of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).256 Writing for the Second
Circuit panel, then-Chief Judge Jacobs reversed the conviction on
the grounds that the operative section of the EEA (unlike a companion section addressing foreign espionage) requires the relevant
253. See supra note 160 (reporting data on 2014 white-collar crime categories, indicating
that a higher proportion of criminal filings in the Second Circuit charged embezzlement,
fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, and regulatory offenses).
254. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
256. See 676 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2012).
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products to be “produced for” or “placed in” interstate or foreign
commerce, which Goldman’s HFT system was not. In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied heavily on legislative history, including
prior bill versions as well as the Senate and House reports.257 The
initial Senate bill did not have the key commerce-related limiting
language, but instead simply applied to persons who stole proprietary economic information above a certain monetary value
($100,000).258 The limiting language was introduced in the House
bill, and the court relied on this drafting history to conclude that
“[t]he words of limitation ... were deliberately chosen.”259
In United States v. Capoccia, an issue on appeal involved the
scope of the district court’s forfeiture order, following defendant attorney’s conviction on thirteen counts related to his debt-reduction
services targeting consumers.260 Writing for the panel, then-Judge
Sotomayor concluded that the government was not entitled to forfeiture of funds the defendant obtained from transfers prior to the
transactions for which he was convicted.261 Judge Sotomayor relied
on both the House committee reports and a Senate floor statement
specifying that the statute was aimed at preventing abuses of the
civil forfeiture process by encouraging the government to “seek
forfeiture through criminal proceedings, where it would have to link
targeted property to a specific criminal conviction.”262
In United States v. MacPherson, the government appealed from
a district court judgment of acquittal, setting aside a jury’s guilty
verdict in a money-laundering case.263 The appeal addressed the
requisite mens rea elements of the charged offense. Judge Raggi for
the Second Circuit panel reviewed the extended history of the
relevant prohibitions on structuring cash transactions, and concluded that Congress’s rapid override of a 1994 Supreme Court decision
established that willfulness was not an element necessary for
257. See id. at 79-82.
258. See id. at 79-80. The Senate bill did include a statement asserting that the development and production of economic proprietary information automatically implicates interstate
commerce, but the Second Circuit emphasized that this was a finding within the bill rather
than a separate textual requirement. See id. at 79.
259. See id. at 80.
260. See 503 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
261. See id. at 117-18.
262. See id. at 116.
263. See 424 F.3d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 2005).

750

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:681

conviction.264 The panel accordingly reinstated the conviction after
establishing that the evidence supported defendant’s knowledge of
and intent to evade currency reporting requirements.265
Finally, in United States v. Milstein, the defendant challenged the
district court’s order that he pay more than three million dollars in
restitution to drug manufacturers whose trademarks he misappropriated.266 The issue on appeal was whether the Victim and Witness
Protection Act, which provided for “lost income” in cases of bodily
injury, but was silent regarding recovery for loss or destruction of
property, covered defendant’s misconduct. In affirming the order of
restitution, District Judge Rakoff (sitting by designation) reasoned
that nothing in the text or legislative history precluded restitution
for lost profits, and that the Act’s primary aim as set forth in the
Senate report (requiring “the wrongdoer ... to the degree possible to
restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being”) would be
thwarted if such economic injuries were excluded.267
There are numerous other Second Circuit decisions relying on
legislative history to support resolution of interpretive issues in
white-collar criminal settings.268 To be sure, the two other circuits
also have cases involving white-collar offenses in which the appeals
court invoked legislative history as part of its analysis.269
264. See id. at 188-89.
265. See id. at 195.
266. See 481 F.3d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 2007).
267. See id. at 136 (omission in original).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Lauersen, 648 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(regarding delinquency and default penalties following businessman’s recurrent violation of
supervised release conditions); United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 377 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding the destruction or falsification of documents is covered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)); United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (regarding
mail and wire fraud, and restitution under Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 335-36 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding receipt of funds
is covered by “transaction” as part of conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956); see also Gordon v. Softech Int’l, Inc., 726 F.3d 42, 50-51
(2d Cir. 2013) (regarding pattern of threats and harassment under Drivers Privacy Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721); Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 67-70 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(holding nation of Afghanistan is not immune under noncommercial tort exception to Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012), in action brought by estate of a victim of
September 11 attacks).
269. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc., v. Barczewski, 604 F.3d 1004, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2010)
(regarding the unauthorized interception of encrypted satellite system signals); United States
v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010) (regarding the scope of restitution requirements incident to wire fraud conviction); United States v. Wittig, 528 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th
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Nonetheless, the proportion of appeals involving white-collar
offenses is considerably greater for the Second Circuit in our dataset, and it seems likely that this is an important element in the
substantially higher level of legislative history use for criminal law
cases.270
C. A Protean Approach to Statutory Interpretation
1. Empirical and Doctrinal Comparisons Summarized
We have attempted to demonstrate various ways in which the
courts of appeals embrace eclectic, situation-specific positions when
construing federal statutes. Their use of dictionaries is more substantial in commercial decisions and certain complex labor and
employment cases, and less so in routine criminal appeals. But even
in the substantial commercial and ERISA cases, circuit court judges
tend to invoke dictionaries as part of a broad palette of interpretive
resources, notably including reliance on legislative purpose and
practical consequences. Relatedly, and unlike Supreme Court
Justices during this period, appeals court judges seem to eschew
reliance on dictionaries as part of a hard textualist barrier. We
found no evidence that circuit courts are disposed, over the objections of their panel colleagues, to use ordinary meaning as a basis
for precluding consideration of less textual elements such as
legislative history or agency deference.
With respect to legislative history, appeals court judges again
seem versatile and functional in their approach. They invoke legislative record evidence in straightforward fashion for a range of traditional ambiguity-resolving and text-confirming purposes. They do
so without reference to, or apparent interest in, the clashes over the
legitimacy and desirability of legislative history that for decades
have characterized Supreme Court statutory decision-making.
Appeals court judges also seem to turn to legislative history more
Cir. 2008) (regarding an occupational restriction incident to money-laundering conviction).
Interestingly, there appear to be more of these white-collar cases in the Tenth Circuit than
the Seventh, and the Tenth Circuit has a higher level of legislative history usage in criminal
law cases—14.4 percent versus 7.6 percent. See supra Table 3.
270. Data for this calculation are on file with the authors. The overall rates of white-collar
cases in the three circuits are presented in supra note 160.
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often in criminal law cases that involve white-collar prosecutions,
which may reflect the lawyering resources produced on both sides
or the complexity of the statutory provisions regulating these kinds
of offenses.
We do not mean to characterize as “protean” the mere absence of
a consistent methodological approach across different fields and
under particular circumstances. Rather, these variations operate as
evidence of, and perhaps also a precondition to, the pragmatic
adaptability that we identify as protean. What underlies the varied
degrees of emphasis accorded to dictionaries and legislative history
in case-specific settings is circuit judges’ apparent understanding
that when engaged in the “practical reasoning”271 of construing
statutes, they must work with any and all recognized tools at their
disposal. Their efforts often yield thin applications when simple
textual analysis leads to easy results. But in numerous other
instances, they result in thicker applications, based on judicial
perceptions that sufficient textual clarity, or conclusive statutory
meaning, cannot be achieved without reference to non-text-based
resources—such as indicia of general purpose and specific
intent—as well as practical considerations. Regardless of the
density, appeals court judges seem to apply their layers of interpretive analysis unfettered by the dogmatic constraints of competing
interpretive theories.
We also do not mean to imply that the Supreme Court’s statutory
interpretation approach has been exclusively or even predominantly
rigid. Our prior research indicates that the Court’s use of dictionaries is often functional and combined with other resources.272
Similarly, we know that the Justices’ patterns of legislative history
usage suggest their appreciation for how committee reports are
more valuable interpretive guides in some subject fields, while floor
statements are more reliable in others,273 and for how even “liberal”
271. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip F. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN . L. REV. 321, 322 (1990).
272. See, e.g., Mac’s Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co., 559 U.S. 175, 182-87 (2010)
(commercial law); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 27679, 281 (2009) (labor and employment law); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142-48
(2008) (criminal law). See generally Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra note 14, at 54854 (discussing eleven Court decisions—including five from the Roberts Court—where majority
used dictionary definitions along with practical or purposive considerations).
273. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 45, at 1260-65.

2017]

PROTEAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

753

pro-employee statutes are accompanied by certain “conservative”
pro-employer legislative history on which both liberal and conservative Justices regularly rely.274 There is also some recent evidence to
suggest that the Court may be increasingly interested in tempering
textual considerations with an appreciation for statutory purpose
and practical consequences.275 And with the death of Justice Scalia,
who did so much to encourage and establish bright methodological
lines, the Court may shift further toward a more flexible interpretive approach to construing statutes.
Still, the Court’s use of dictionaries and legislative history in
recent decades has been influenced more by strategic thinking and
methodological messaging than what we have seen occurring in the
courts of appeals.276 It is worth pondering how our findings relate to
the possibility that Supreme Court Justices may inevitably be more
inclined than their appeals court colleagues to articulate consistent
methodological approaches, or to deploy interpretive resources for
strategic or policy-related ends. We identified that possibility in
Part I when we discussed five factors that might give rise to
interpretive divergence between the Supreme Court and courts of
appeals: the role of hierarchical instruction; the repeat player effect;
resource imbalance; congressional and media attention; and the
judicial selection process. Applying these “interpretive divergence”
factors to our empirical results and doctrinal analyses can help
formulate a response to the question of inevitability.
2. Interpretive Divergence Factors Reconsidered
One distinctive factor is the status of Supreme Court Justices as
repeat players, which has encouraged self-conscious exchanges,
heated disagreements, and strategic conduct regarding preferred
methods of statutory interpretation. Since the late 1980s, statutory
274. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30, at 146-57.
275. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1074 (2015); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). See generally Richard M. Re, The
New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 407 (2015).
276. In addition to the examples discussed in this Section, we have shown in our prior work
that the Court’s use of dictionaries in criminal law decisions may convey a larger message
about the importance of providing adequately clear notice as to what the criminal law
prohibits and the extent to which it punishes. See Brudney & Baum, Oasis or Mirage, supra
note 14, at 541-43.
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interpretation debates among the Justices have reflected sharply
expressed differences as to the proper way to respect legislative
supremacy.277 Judicial pronouncements and disagreements about
preferred methodologies seem most likely to arise and flourish when
the Court’s membership remains relatively stable—as it has been
in recent decades.
Our Roberts Court dataset provides ample evidence of these
methodological assertions and disputes. The dictionary barrier cases
involve Justices disagreeing on whether ordinary meaning analysis
should foreclose consideration of factors such as pre-enactment legislative history and purpose or post-enactment agency interpretive
practice. The liberal Justices’ introduction of politely pejorative
prefaces when they rely on legislative history reflects a strategic
judgment to accommodate a colleague by effectively relegating the
resource to lesser importance. And the remarkably frequent use of
vertical history in the Roberts Court suggests that the Justices have
become more comfortable invoking textualist forms of legislative
history, which do less to roil the waters.
In all of this self-conscious methodological dialogue, it would be
hard to overstate the role played by one forcefully articulate
member of the repeat-player Court. Justice Scalia’s rhetorically
powerful, rule-based beliefs about the role of ordinary textual
meaning, dictionaries, canons, and legislative history and purpose
helped elevate statutory interpretation to a prominent place in
Supreme Court discourse. While Justice Scalia’s untimely departure
is not likely to end methodological disagreements at the Court,278 it
seems plausible to anticipate that the exchanges may become less
intense and colorfully expressed, and that the Justices may abandon
certain strategic interpretive gambits.279
277. See supra notes 5-8, 21 and accompanying text; see also Bank One Chi., N.A. v.
Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-79 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) (defending
legislative history as probative evidence regarding statutory meaning); id. at 279-83 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (dismissing legislative history as illegitimate and nonprobative).
278. See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (featuring disagreement
about the relevance and primacy of ordinary meaning, the ejusdem generis canon, drafting
history, and legislative purpose in separate opinions by Justice Thomas (majority), Justice
Kennedy (dissent), and Justice Breyer (dissent)).
279. See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 967-68, 973-75 (2016) (criminal law
statutory decision in which Justices Sotomayor (majority) and Kagan (dissent) disagree at
length over weight and implications of a Senate committee report and Justice Department
letter to House committee, with no diminutive references to status or role of legislative
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Similar methodological debates have not occurred among circuit
court judges in our dataset, and they are very unlikely to take place
on a court of appeals panel. Specific sets of three appeals court
judges sit together infrequently, and—as evidenced in our three
circuits—they often do not have their regular offices in the same city
or even state.280 We suggested that on the Seventh Circuit, where
Judges Posner and Easterbrook have been relatively outspoken in
their criticisms of dictionaries as an interpretive resource for appellate judges, the influence of these two longstanding leaders on the
appellate bench may contribute to the unusually low level of
dictionary usage in that circuit.281 But our suggestion is necessarily
speculative when compared to what we know has occurred at the
Supreme Court level.
Although we concluded in Part I that the Supreme Court’s role as
a hierarchical instructor on methods of statutory interpretation was
likely to be extremely limited, there is one finding that suggests the
possibility of appeals court attention to Supreme Court methodology, even if not adherence to that methodology as precedent. We
found that for court of appeals opinions on which certiorari was
granted, the ratio between legislative history use and dictionary use
in all appeals court cases (more than two to one favoring legislative
history) was substantially reduced (to 1.36 to 1).282 We speculated
that if appeals court judges recognize when circuit conflicts are
likely to attract Supreme Court attention, as they surely do, these
judges may well be drawn (even if subconsciously) to invoke interpretive resources that are favored by the Supreme Court when
contributing to or creating such a circuit conflict.283 In particular,
history).
280. Second Circuit judges sit in panels in lower Manhattan, but five of the eleven active
judges have their chambers elsewhere—in Connecticut, Vermont, or other parts of New York.
For information on court of appeals judges and chambers, see the directory available at 2
ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, Westlaw (database updated July 2016). Seventh Circuit
panels convene in Chicago, but three of the nine active judges have their chambers in Indiana
or Wisconsin. Id. And the Tenth Circuit, which sits in Denver, encompasses district courts in
six states—nine of the twelve active judges have their chambers outside of Colorado. Id.
281. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
282. See supra text following note 85.
283. This process is not necessarily unconscious. According to one Eleventh Circuit judge,
The audience of a dissenting opinion often includes another entity—the United
States Supreme Court. When drafting a dissenting opinion, I often consider
whether the parties will file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme

756

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:681

appeals court judges may be more inclined to invoke dictionaries—a
favored resource among the Justices—if the judges anticipate that
their majority opinion could become the subject of Court review on
the merits.
The factor of resource imbalance between the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals appears to have less explanatory value than projected, at least when comparing interpretive techniques. As noted
earlier, some scholars hypothesized that because legislative history
research and analysis in particular require a special investment of
time and reflection, this investment should be made more regularly
by Supreme Court Justices, who have the benefit of extensive
amicus briefs, high quality lawyering on both sides, and a far lighter
merits docket than their circuit court colleagues.284 But while the
Supreme Court did invoke legislative history twice as often as did
the courts of appeals in our dataset,285 the Justices invoked dictionaries nearly four times as often as their circuit court colleagues.286
Put differently, circuit court judges cited legislative history more
than double the number of times they cited dictionaries—and they
relied on legislative history at a slightly higher rate as well.287 Given
that dictionaries are readily accessible to these judges, it would
seem that the labor-intensive aspects of consulting legislative history play little if any role in explaining differential uses of the two
interpretive assets.
Resources may be more relevant when considering appeals courts’
substantially greater use of both legislative history and dictionaries
in commercial law cases compared with criminal and labor and
Court. If I believe that the parties will, I write the dissent with the Supreme
Court in mind.
Hon. Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions Are Developed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L. REV. 247, 266 n.102 (2003).
284. See supra Part I.C.
285. See supra Table 3.
286. See supra text accompanying note 66.
287. The reliance rate for appeals court judges was 77.5 percent for legislative history and
73 percent for dictionary definitions (Supreme Court reliance rates were 82.5 percent for
legislative history and 82 percent for dictionaries). See supra text accompanying note 91 and
Part II.A.2. The difference in circuit court reliance rates is small; our point is simply, contrary
to the predictions of some scholars, that appeals court judges were prepared to “separate the
wheat from the chaff, the reliable from the opportunistic, the real deals from the cheap talk”
regarding legislative history resources as often or slightly more often than they delved into
the nuances or contextual relevance of dictionary definitions. See Bruhl, supra note 4, at 474.
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employment cases. The commercial subject area tends to involve
higher levels of lawyering resources on both sides at the appeals
court level than is true for the other two fields, where resource
imbalance is often a reality. In addition to the parties’ financial
capacity and willingness to underwrite lawyering efforts, the complexity of commercial law subject matter may encourage more
extensive research and analysis, particularly when compared with
criminal law appeals that are very often routine and fact-based.
Beyond the factor of resources, a more focused level of congressional and interest group attention may help explain the markedly
higher use of dictionaries and legislative history in commercial law
cases. As discussed earlier, prior research indicates that congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions are most frequent in
criminal and civil rights cases; by contrast, overrides of circuit court
decisions occur more often in the economic regulatory area.288
Relatedly, it appears that substantially fewer commercial law cases
are decided by the Supreme Court than either criminal or labor and
employment cases.289 This is perhaps in part because certiorari
grants in the two other areas more often reflect the urging of the
Solicitor General on behalf of the federal government as an interested party or amicus.290
Absent extensive Supreme Court attention, commercial law cases
in the circuits—in which heavy regulatory and financial burdens are
often at stake—attract the special interest of a corporate audience.
This audience of business attorneys and company executives has
ample resources to lobby Congress for adjustments or fixes. In addition, circuit judges may have a particular desire to “look good”
before the sophisticated attorneys who brief and argue these
commercial cases, especially given that many judges came from that
288. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (reporting results of scholarly studies).
289. See supra text preceding note 59 (identifying 94 criminal law cases, 87 labor and
employment law cases, and 50 commercial law cases in Roberts Court dataset). Our selection
was based on cases arising under prominent titles of the U.S. Code (18 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.); while we do not contend that this represents all statutory cases in the
three fields, the disparity between commercial law and the two other fields is striking.
290. The United States is a party in virtually all criminal cases arising under 18 U.S.C.,
and is a party or amicus in many if not most civil “prosecutions” arising under 29 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C. By contrast, commercial disputes under 15 U.S.C. are often between two private
parties. On the impact of the Solicitor General on cert. grants, see RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J.
OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE
BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 49-71 (2012).
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practice setting.291 This form of reputational interest also might
contribute to judges writing more extensive and thorough opinions
that encompass multiple interpretive resources.
In sum, the business community and its congressional allies are
likely to pay special attention to important appeals court decisions
in the commercial law area. It is reasonable to assume that circuit
judges have some sense of this attentiveness, based on awareness
of more frequent overrides and perhaps also on an enhanced interest in their reputations before the corporate bar. That awareness,
along with the investment of lawyerly resources, seems likely to
contribute to a greater use of dictionaries and legislative history by
circuit court judges seeking to explain and justify their decisions in
textual or purposive terms.
Finally, the judicial selection factor appears relevant in this
interpretive setting, but with an important extension. We suggested
earlier that the Justices, as part of their high profile confirmation
proceedings, are susceptible to articulating theories of neutral interpretation.292 As we noted, this effect is minimal for appeals court
judges, whose confirmation hearings draw little or no attention from
the national media and usually attract only minimal interest from
the legal community and Congress.293
Differences in the levels of attention that nominees for the
Supreme Court and courts of appeals receive are reproduced once
they are settled on the bench. Supreme Court Justices receive
extraordinary scrutiny among attentive audiences—including the
legal media, academics, and legislators. Because they stand below
the top level of the courts and because they are far more numerous,
with over 200 active and senior judges, members of the courts of
appeals receive considerably less scrutiny. By the same token,
Justices have a much better opportunity to cultivate their reputations among attentive audiences.294
For both reasons, Justices have stronger incentives to adopt
distinctive interpretive methods. In particular, when Justices
291. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM , JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR, 97-99, 114-16 (2006).
292. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
293. See supra text following note 47.
294. On interest in reputation among judges, and especially Supreme Court Justices, see
BAUM , supra note 291, at 32-45.
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essentially self-identify as textualist, purposivist, or pragmatist in
their interpretive orientations, they express an approach to construing statutes that is philosophical rather than ideological. By doing
so, they can communicate that whichever interpretive method they
follow is neutral rather than political, is respectful of legislative
supremacy, and is nonactivist. Moreover, the philosophical selfidentification contributes to fostering a judicial image as principled
and thoughtful.295 These considerations help to create individual
predilections such as an affinity for dictionaries or avoidance of
legislative history, and the repeat player status of Justices enhances
the impact of those predilections on the Court as a whole.
Appeals court judges do not interact with the same audience on
a national stage. Further, they have less time for methodological
articulations given their more onerous caseloads. There are a
handful of notable exceptions (such as Judges Katzmann, Posner,
Easterbrook, and also Justice Breyer when he was on the appellate
bench) who opine and interact publicly about the relative values of
legislative history, canons, or dictionaries as part of the judicial
toolkit.296 But for the most part, circuit court judges offer interpretive guidance that is inflected through case-specific settings as part
of their dialogue with parties, not extrajudicial audiences.297 As we
have demonstrated with our data, this guidance can be highly
situational and pragmatic, based on subject matter variations,
differing legislative purposes or related contexts, diverse litigation
postures, and a range of practical and policy consequences.

295. This consideration is reflected in the books by Justices Breyer and Scalia: STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK : A JUDGE’S VIEW (2010); Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW : THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
296. See supra note 55 (citing to works by Katzmann, Posner, Easterbrook); see also Hon.
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845 (1992). See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379; Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 380, 386; see also generally William H. Pryor Jr., The Perspective of a Junior Circuit
Judge on Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1013 (2008) (distancing himself from Judge
Posner’s “pragmatic approach” to judging, and briefly characterizing his own approach as
formalist or legalist).
297. But see BAUM , supra note 291, at 36.
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3. Normative Implications
At the end of Part I, we raised the question whether, assuming
the circuit courts’ methods of statutory interpretation are, as an
empirical matter, more pragmatic and adaptable—and less selfconsciously doctrinaire—than the Supreme Court’s, this protean
approach has anything to recommend it in normative terms. Having
established that there are in fact salient differences in interpretive
approach between the two judicial levels, we now identify several
possible benefits to the pragmatism and adaptability favored by the
courts of appeals.
One benefit is epistemological. The protean approach assumes
that, except for disputes where a law’s directive is unassailably
clear, consideration of more resources rather than fewer tends to
expand judicial knowledge and sophistication when resolving even
arguably ambiguous or inconclusive statutory language. This idea
dates back at least to Chief Justice Marshall’s tenure,298 but it
currently resonates more in the circuit courts than the Supreme
Court. While text remains the starting point and the most authoritative source for appeals court judges, purpose, intent, and practical
impact may all become relevant under a given set of facts and
circumstances. Considering these additional sources of potential
insight also minimizes the risk of subjective detours—at least for
judges who approach each interpretive dispute on its own terms
rather than as part of a larger doctrinal construct.
A second benefit of the protean approach is its democratizing
influence. In appropriate circumstances, a degree of skepticism
about textual certainty is accompanied by attention to what the
politically accountable branches have said regarding the meaning
of disputed text—through potentially relevant legislative history
and agency constructions. Consideration of these resources may in
the end prove less than helpful. But the exercise of doing so
represents an integration (as opposed to a reordering) of authority
sources from the three branches; in that subtle respect, it is a
humbling process for the judiciary.

298. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (“Where the mind
labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived.”).
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A final benefit of the protean approach is that its ad hoc qualities
serve as a check on the prospect of methodological stare decisis
power from the Supreme Court. We noted earlier that appeals court
judges do move more toward the Justices’ current interpretive
priorities and penchants when perceiving that the dispute before
them is likely to fall within the Court’s jurisdictional purview. But
the vast majority of appeals court fare involves statutory disputes
that are not close to certworthy. And in those instances, the range
of distinguishing factors between Supreme Court and appeals court
cases—stemming from factors such as dissimilarities in workload,
legal complexity, policy implications, lawyering resources, and
repeat-player culture—justify the divergent approach.
To be clear, the benefits of a protean approach need not be limited
to appeals court decision-making. If the Supreme Court were to
announce its own commitment to such an approach—a pragmatic
and adaptable standard rather than a prescriptively fixed set of
rules—such a standard could well serve as flexible guidance for
lower federal courts. We assume that circuit court judges would
accord respect to this type of guidance, both because it integrates
the importance of situation-specific methodological analysis and
because it reinforces circuit judges’ predilections to approach statutory interpretation in this adaptable way. For now though, the
Supreme Court has issued no such guidance; instead, the Justices
remain largely divided along textualist and purposivist lines.299
CONCLUSION
Our inquiry in this Article has addressed a wide range of issues
related to the resources that the federal courts of appeals use when
interpreting statutes. We have identified important differences
between the appeals courts and the Supreme Court in their use of,

299. See supra notes 5-8, 20-21 and accompanying text. For evidence of tensions between
lessons drawn from these current rule-based Supreme Court approaches, compare U.S. v.
Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (invoking 1997 Supreme
Court precedent for interpretive approach that begins and ends with plain meaning unless
text is ambiguous), with Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2010) (invoking
a different 1997 Supreme Court precedent for three-step interpretive framework featuring
natural reading of full text, common law meaning of statutory terms, and consideration of
statutory and legislative history).
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and reliance on, two key resources—dictionary definitions and legislative history.
Most broadly, we have found evidence that judges on the courts
of appeals are more pragmatic and eclectic than the Justices in their
use of these resources. That pragmatic eclecticism is reflected in
differences in usage patterns both between and within fields defined
by their subject matter. It is also reflected in appeals courts’
straightforward reliance on legislative history to resolve ambiguities, confirm apparent meaning, or simply explicate legislative intent—all without characterizing the legitimacy or systemic value of
that record evidence.
Related to this protean approach is a lack of explicit self-consciousness about the use of interpretive resources. Circuit court
judges focus in their decisions on resolving disputes brought by the
parties before them. They have not found it necessary or useful to
that task to elevate a single interpretive resource or propound a
unified interpretive theory. Moreover, animated at least in part by
the hydraulic pressures of their large dockets, these judges follow a
multi-resource interpretive path without apparent collegial strains
or even second thoughts.
At first glance, this approach to statutory interpretation may
seem less advisable than the more distinctive and self-conscious
methodological path that characterizes some Supreme Court Justices and, to a degree, the Court as a whole. Although the Justices
disagree with each other—at times fiercely—about priorities in the
use of interpretive resources, there appears to be acceptance at both
the appeals court and Supreme Court levels of the underlying norm
that judges perform best in statutory interpretation when they have
less discretion.300 One possible implication from this norm is that
adopting clear, rule-like principles as to the use of particular
resources and applying those principles consistently is desirable
because it reduces judicial discretion.301

300. Compare KATZMANN , supra note 55, at 41, 48, with Scalia, supra note 295, at 38.
301. For a recent spirited debate between two federal court of appeals judges regarding the
rules versus standards approach to statutory interpretation, compare Brett M. Kavanaugh,
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016) (reviewing KATZMANN , supra
note 55), with Robert A. Katzmann, Response to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging
Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388 (2016).
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We think, however, that a better case can be made for a protean
approach. No practice in the use of interpretive resources can eliminate subjectivity. Substitution of dictionary definitions for legislative history might appear to be a way of avoiding biased selectivity
in the use of legislative history, as Justice Scalia rightly worried
about. But our own empirical analysis of Supreme Court dictionary
use indicates rampant cherry-picking in the invocation of that
resource as well. Further, interpretive theories can reinforce judges’
ideological positions rather than blunting the impact of those
positions, and there is considerable evidence that this has been true
at the Supreme Court in the use of legislative history and also the
canons.302
Thus we tend to agree with Judge Katzmann that the more resources a judge believes she must seriously examine and honestly
evaluate for impact on a contested statutory provision, the more
likely the resulting decision will minimize judicial subjectivity,
which is a useful proxy for avoiding undue judicial discretion.303 By
the same token, it is valuable for judges to adapt their use of interpretive resources to the different angles of vision called for in
different fields of law and even individual cases.
Recent decisions that we alluded to earlier suggest some movement toward a more pragmatic stance on statutory interpretation
in the Supreme Court.304 Although this may signal the early stages
of a new interpretive cycle for the Justices,305 the Court’s current
approach has become acculturated over an extended period, and one
should not expect a change to take place overnight. Still, for the
reasons we have discussed, it would be a positive development if the
Court moved closer—both practically and self-consciously—to the
protean approach we have identified in the courts of appeals.

302. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 30 (reporting on ideologically linked uses of
legislative history); Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1 (reporting on ideologically linked uses
of canons).
303. See Katzmann, supra note 301, at 398.
304. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489-96 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 1074, 1081-89 (2015); Bond v. United States 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-94 (2014); see also
supra text accompanying note 275.
305. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 149 (2001).

